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Executive summary 
PROJECT GOALS 
This project investigated the role of industrial relations in addressing precarious work. It focused on the 
initiatives and responses that trade unions and employers’ associations developed to deal with precarious 
work in Croatia, the Czech Republic (hereafter Czechia), Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia since 2008. In each country, the study analysed developments in five 
sectors, namely public healthcare, the metal industry, construction, retail and temporary agency work 
(TAW). The project used a qualitative approach to examine the dimensions of precarious employment, 
including low pay, irregular working hours, low job security and limited representation of workers’ rights.  
DUAL LABOUR MARKETS 
Apart from an increase in the share of non-standard work contracts since 2008, findings suggest that all 
forms of employment were exposed to more precarious conditions following various degrees of labour 
market deregulation across the 10 countries. In a context of weak law enforcement and decreasing unions’ 
role and influence, employers were able to use (and sometimes abuse) their enlarged prerogatives to 
increase the workload, the use of irregular working time and sometimes, to reduce the income of workers 
on all types of contracts. Still, workers in the informal market and dependent self-employed have the most 
precarious working conditions across the countries. These vulnerable groups are most prevalent in the 
construction and the retail sectors, often doing work for small domestic firms. In contrast, large (often 
multinational) firms, particularly in the construction and metal sectors use more frequently outsourcing to 
reduce labour costs. The share of agency workers, fixed-term and part-time employees has risen across the 
countries but less than expected in some countries (e.g. Croatia and Romania) due to labour shortages 
associated with massive emigration and the fact that employers have sufficient leverage to demand 
employees on full-time open ended contracts to work irregular hours contingent on companies’ needs.  
RESPONSES OF SOCIAL PARTNERS TO PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT 
Social partners focused primarily on legal initiatives to regulate precarious work at the national level, 
while additional initiatives, such as collective bargaining were used at lower levels. Employers’ initiatives 
generally sought to deregulate the labour market and they have been quite successful, in most countries. 
Unions’ initiatives to improve precarious employment conditions through legislation often failed, which 
sometimes resulted in innovative or ‘recombined’ old and new strategies to fight against precarious work. 
In some countries, unions managed to organise the most vulnerable workers, such as self-employed and 
outsourced employees. Nevertheless, unions’ strategies varied across countries from aiming to transform 
precarious work arrangements into standard employment in Slovenia to supporting the economic rationale 
of precarious work forms in Latvia.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Periods of crisis throw new light on the role of the social partners. The labour market deregulation has 
shifted the initiative in industrial relations from unions and employers’ associations to individual 
employers by widening their prerogatives to set employment conditions, which in turn, increased the 
dualization of the labour markets. Furthermore, there is evidence of precarious work practices being 
exported by multinationals across their subsidiaries, prompting convergence of management practices. 
Trade unions need to be aware of the international dimension of precarious work, as they could also use 
their international networks, including their positions in European Works Councils, to fight against 
spreading precarious work by multinationals and a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards. Nevertheless, 
social partners cannot fight against precarious work, unless governments guarantee, at least, the 
fundamental union rights and ensure the effective implementation of labour laws. 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 1: Conceptual framework: social partners and precarious work ............................................ 7 
1.1 Definition and dimensions of precarious employment ............................................................... 7 
1.2  Objectives and research questions ............................................................................................. 8 
1.3 Analytical approach to dimensions of precariousness ................................................................ 9 
1.4 Analytical framework on social partners’ actions .................................................................... 12 
          1.4.1 Trade unions’ actions vis-à-vis precarious work .............................................................. 12 
          1.4.2 Employers’ associations (and their members) actions vis-à-vis precarious work ............ 16 
1.5 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 22 
Chapter 2: Incidence of precarious work across countries ................................................................... 23 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 23 
2.2 Incidence and forms of precarious work across countries ........................................................ 24 
           2.2.1 Post-2008 changes in the regulatory framework ............................................................. 25 
           2.2.2 The impact of post-2008 regulatory changes on the precarization of work .................... 29 
2.3 Trends in work precariousness across countries in the selected sectors ................................... 32 
2.4 Concluding remarks: varieties of dualization and precarization .............................................. 38 
Chapter 3: Trade unions and precarious work ...................................................................................... 40 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 40 
3.2 The rationales for trade unions actions vis-à-vis precarious work across countries................. 42 
3.3 Trade unions’ actions vis-à-vis precarious work across sectors ............................................... 44 
           3.3.1 Construction sector .......................................................................................................... 44 
           3.3.2 Healthcare sector ............................................................................................................. 47 
           3.3.3 Retail sector ..................................................................................................................... 49 
           3.3.4 Metal sector ..................................................................................................................... 52 
           3.3.5 Temporary agency work sector ....................................................................................... 55 
3.4 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 57 
Chapter 4: Employers and precarious work........................................................................................... 61 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 61 
4.2 Employers’ rationales vis-à-vis precarious work ..................................................................... 62 
4.3 Employers’ approaches vis-à-vis precarious work ................................................................... 66 
4.4 Employers’ instruments vis-à-vis precarious work .................................................................. 69 
4.5 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................. 71 
Chapter 5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 72 
iv 
 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 72 
5.2 The incidence and nature of precarious work in CEE countries and Greece ........................... 74 
5.3 The role of the industrial relations actors in dealing with precarious work ............................. 76 
5.4 A future beyond precarious work ............................................................................................. 78 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 81 
 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1: Analytical framework for studying the role of unions in shaping precarious employment ......... 12 
Figure 2: Trade union approaches to precarious workers and their implications  ....................................... 14 
Figure 3: Analytical framework for studying the role of employersin shaping precarious employment .... 18 
Figure 4: Employers approaches to precarious workers and their implications  ......................................... 21 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Dimensions of precariousness ....................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2: Trade union instruments to meet the purpose of union approaches to precarious work ............... 15 
Table 3: Employers’ associations’ (and their members’) rationales regarding the use of precarious work 18 
Table 4: Employers’ associations’ (and their members’) instruments to implement strategies .................. 21 
Table 5: Summary of the number of interviews (conducted in mostly in 2015) ......................................... 24 
Table 6: Trends in employment protection legislation since 2008 across countries ................................... 26 
Table 7: Trends in collective bargaining coverage across the 10 countries ................................................ 29 
Table 8: Trends in  self-employment across countries (2008-2015) ........................................................... 30 
Table 9: Fixed-term contracts across countries (2008-2015) ...................................................................... 31 
Table 10: Part-time contracts across countries (2008-2015) ....................................................................... 32 
Table 11: Trends in trade union density (2008 -2012) ................................................................................ 41 
Table 12: Employers’ economic considerations .......................................................................................... 63 
Table 13: Employers’ institutional considerations ...................................................................................... 64 
Table 14: Employers’ social legitimacy considerations .............................................................................. 65 
Table 15: Employers’ organisational considerations .................................................................................. 66 
Table 16: Employers’ approaches vis-à-vis precarious work ...................................................................... 69 
 
 5 
Introduction 
The EU accession and the economic crisis facilitated important changes in the 
dynamics of labour markets across the new Member States in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). While the EU accession produced labour shortages in some countries 
and sectors (Kaminska and Kahancova, 2011; Trif, 2008), the economic crisis has 
accelerated the rise of non-standard, or precarious, employment forms that has since 
existed parallel to standard employment forms with decent levels of pay and 
employment security (Sala and Silva, 2009). Similar developments can also be 
observed in the case of Greece, where the introduction of wide-ranging and radical 
austerity measures has accelerated labour market deregulation affecting not only 
employment protection legislation but also collective bargaining structures 
(Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 2016).  
In a micro-level perspective, precariousness may produce inequality, instability, and 
insecurity: this is because people who lose their jobs easily or fear losing their jobs 
lack alternative employment opportunities, and or lack opportunities to develop or 
maintain particular skills. Non-standard, or precarious, work has gained in importance 
and has even become the norm in certain sectors, with the retail sector being 
considered now the low-pay and precarious sector (Mrozowicki et al., 2013). 
Precariousness increases also in relation to certain occupations that tend to attract 
vulnerable groups, such as youth, women and migrants. In a macro-level perspective, 
the implications of the rise of precarious employment are a dualized, or fragmented, 
labour market, where fixed-term contracts, part-time contracts, dependent self-
employment, temporary agency work and casual work are crowding out the standard 
employment contracts (Sala and Silva, 2009; Mrozowicki et al., 2013). The growth of 
precarious employment also implies a return to individual contractual arrangements 
and a move away from a collective regulation of employment conditions (Gallagher 
and Sverke, 2005; Standing, 1999). Employers face a double-pressure for market 
competitiveness and work flexibilization, while trade unions seek new ways of coping 
with precariousness and the interest representation of precarious employees. While 
trade unions struggle to improve the working conditions and economic and social 
rights of precarious employees, they simultaneously try to reduce precarious 
employment forms and defend the standard employment relationship with decent 
working conditions, pay and job security. This paradox has been examined in the 
literature on outsiders/insiders divide in the context of old EU Member States, where 
‘over-protection’ of workers with permanent contracts is associated with weakening 
protection for marginal groups (EC, 2012). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether there 
are similar developments in the context of the new EU Member States, particularly in 
a recent widespread deregulation of the employment rights for employees on standard 
contracts. 
The increase in precariousness in everyday working life has received increased policy 
attention both at national and EU levels.  The latter is manifested in various EU policy 
documents that aim to improve the economic and social rights of vulnerable groups in 
precarious employment forms, including the EU Figures of Fundamental Rights (e.g. 
Articles 31 and 32) and a number of EU directives on non-standard employment, 
including part-time and fixed-term work, as well as on working time. In addition, the 
European Employment Strategy encourages the Member States to complement the 
increasing labour market flexibility with decent social security and stable 
employment.  
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The aim of this project is to analyze the role of industrial relations institutions in 
addressing changes in the labour markets, focusing on the growth of precarious work 
in the EU. Despite its importance, little evidence is available on the strategies of 
social partners to address the rise of the dual labour market. To fill this gap, this 
project explores how the strategies of employers and trade unions across 10 EU 
Member States represent the interest of non-standard and vulnerable groups in 
precarious employment forms in the labour market; and how the needs of these 
groups are addressed in the process of collective bargaining and other initiatives by 
the social partners.  
PRECARIR is innovative in two aspects. The first one is the focus on nine new EU 
Member States in CEE and Greece as an example of a country facing a significant 
economic crisis. The second innovative aspect is the project’s actor-oriented approach 
and focus on the role of social partners as industrial relations actors that help shape 
the social dialogue processes and bargaining outcomes to address precarious 
employment in the above countries. For example, in Poland, where non-standard 
employment has become widespread in view of subsequent waves of labour market 
deregulation, …  there has been  ‘a chronic lack of effective actors who dare[d] to 
address (…) poor working conditions and precarious living situations’ (Trappmann, 
2011: 15). In Slovakia, unions have changed since 2011 their approach to temporary 
agency workers from a strategy of exclusion to one of integration (Kahancová and 
Martišková, 2014). The PRECARIR project examines whether social partners are 
adjusting their actions to modifications in the labour market.   
To account for these developments, the project partners collected and analyzed new 
empirical evidence on adaptation mechanisms and assessed on how effective these are 
in dealing with the rise of precarious employment. In particular, we engage in 
country-specific, sector-specific and comparative studies of the strategies and actions 
that the social partners have undertaken: 
 to address the rise of the dual labour market, and especially the growth of 
precarious work, 
 to protect, represent and improve through collective bargaining and social 
dialogue the social rights of vulnerable employee groups in precarious 
employment, 
 to adjust industrial relations structures and bargaining procedures to better 
reflect the character of the post-crisis dual labour market.  
Subsequent to the introduction, the report has two main parts. The first part (chapter 
1) presents the analytical framework used to examine developments in each country. 
It starts with a definition of precarious work, including the dimensions of 
precariousness investigated and the research objectives. Then, it reviews the relevant 
literature on the role of trade unions and employers (and their associations) in shaping 
precarious employment. It discusses the rationales of the two social partners for 
selecting specific actions to deal with precarious work, their approaches to those 
actions, the instruments used to address precarious work and the implications of their 
actions for precarious work. The second part presents the cross-country analysis and 
discussion of the empirical findings (chapters 2, 3 and 4), using the analytical 
framwork developed in part one. It begins with the incidence and the main forms of 
precarious work (chapter 2). Then, it discusses the role of trade unions in adressing 
precarious work (chapter 3), followed by the role of employers and employers  
associations in shaping precarious employment (chapter 4). It concludes with the 
practical implications of the findings (chapter 5).  
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Chapter 1: Conceptual framework: social partners and precarious work 
 
1.1 Definition and dimensions of precarious employment 
The rise of the dual labour market refers on the one hand to the types of employment 
relationships, and on the other hand to different groups in the labour market. The 
definition of precarious employment is closely related to the definition of non-
standard employment and is derived from the definition of its opposite, e.g. the 
standard employment relationship. Aust and Holst (2007) define standard 
employment relationship as a socially secured, long-term and full-time employment 
with a wage that allows for a decent living. In contrast, non-standard or atypical, 
employment refers to the notion of contingent workforce (Heery, 2009) and involves 
temporary, fixed-term, part-time employment, temporary agency work and dependent 
self-employment (Kahancová and Martišková, 2011). Kalleberg (2009: 2) defined 
precarious employment as “employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky 
from the point of view of the worker”.  
However, non-standard employment is not necessarily precarious (Keller and Seifert, 
2013; Boonstra et al., 2011). For example, part-time employment often results from a 
conscious choice of an individual employee. At the same time, some standard 
employment relationships may be precarious, e.g. when they are low paid, involve an 
excessive amount of unpaid overtime, or when the social rights and entitlements of 
the concerned employee are constrained. Acknowledging the above distinctions, we 
assume that the incidence of precarious employment is particularly high in dualized 
labour markets, and among workers in non-standard employment forms.   
Dörre (2005) identifies precariousness in:  
 the material sphere, because precarious jobs do not secure decent living and 
job security (economic rights),  
 the sphere of social communication, because precarious workers are excluded 
from social networks at their workplace,  
 the legal/institutional sphere, because precarious employees are often excluded 
from access to certain social rights.  
The wider effect of precariousness relates to the fact that it may create a large group 
of vulnerable employees detached from the rest of the labour market participants and 
the society (Dörre, 2005; Castels, 2000).  
Adopting the above definitions of precarious work, improvements in job quality in 
dualized labour markets require addressing and limiting the presented negative 
characteristics of precarious employment. Industrial relations institutions and 
processes, including collective bargaining, belong to the main channels through which 
such improvements can be made. Despite their relevance, there is a lack of scientific 
and policy-oriented literature examining the role of industrial relations in fighting 
precarious employment. In addition, the available literature is often limited to 
evidence from Western European countries, including France, Germany and the UK 
(Heery and Abbott, 2000; Bispinck and Schulten, 2011). Systematic evidence on 
developments in precarious work and, the ways in which industrial relations help 
mitigating its negative consequences in crisis-stricken Southern European countries, 
and post-socialist new EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), is 
not available.  
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To analytically define precarious employment, country-specific contributions as well 
as the comparative report adopts the following guidelines in studying precarious 
work: 
 distinguishing precarious work from non-standard work, 
 focusing on measurable dimensions of precarious work (see dimensions 
below),  
 adopting an economic and social rights perspective on precariousness, 
encompassing both individual and collective rights of employees, 
 focusing on the institutionalized, or legally anchored, forms of precarious 
work across the studied EU Member States. 
 
1.2  Objectives and research questions 
The project has five main objectives: 
 To map and review the main legal and labour market characteristics related to 
the particular forms of precarious employment, and provide evidence on the 
developments in precarious employment across 10 EU Member States. Earlier 
research and academic literature provide only a marginal account of 
precarious employment in the new Member States in CEE and Greece. This 
gap in the literature justifies our selection of countries for reviewing trends in 
precarious employment.  
 To analyse the challenges social partners face in improving the economic and 
social rights of precarious workers through collective bargaining and social 
dialogue. 
 To provide insight into the experiences of trade unions regarding organizing 
and representing precarious employees and improving their rights through 
collective bargaining, social dialogue and other related measures. Best 
practices or instructive examples of such trade union action will be presented 
in greater detail in each country study.  
 To analyse the role that industrial relations institutions, processes and 
outcomes are playing in fighting precarious employment across the crisis-
stricken Greece and the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 To draw implications for research and policy making for national-level and 
European-level sectoral stakeholders; and disseminate the project findings to 
these stakeholders. This aim facilitates the promotion of horizontal synergies 
between research and the social partners on issues of key relevance to both 
groups; and transnational learning and capacity building of these actors to 
improve the quality of their work. 
The national reports as well as the comparative report address the following research 
questions: 
 What are the trends in precarious work in the studied countries in the past five 
years?  
 What are the challenges that social partners face in improving the economic 
and social rights of precarious workers through industrial relations processes? 
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 What strategies/actions are social partners undertaking to address precarious 
work?  
 How effective are these strategies/actions (best practices)? 
 What are the implications of social partners actions for: 
o representation? 
o access to legal/collective rights?  
o industrial relations institutions? 
 What lessons/policy implications can be drawn from country-specific 
findings? 
 
1.3 Analytical approach to dimensions of precariousness 
Keller and Seifert (2013) identified a multi-dimensional approach to precariousness, 
which we follow in the current project. They have identified the following dimensions 
to precariousness:  
 Income security: wages below two-thirds of median gross hourly wages in a 
country. 
 Job security: low job security when compared to SER. 
 Social security: limited or no social security entitlements. 
 Employability: hindered access to training, skill development, and similar. 
 Other labour conditions: less favourable than in a SER, e.g., limited access 
to training, holiday and collective benefit entitlements, paid overtime, abuse of 
travel reimbursements, etc.  
In our analysis, we focus especially on income security, job security and social 
security. Moreover, we extend our analysis by focusing on working time in non-
standard employment forms and to the collective voice of precarious workers, or the 
state of their interest representation when compared to workers in SER. This 
operationalization is summarized in a two-dimensional matrix encompassing all of the 
mentioned dimensions of precariousness (see Table 1).  
This matrix allows a qualitative-comparative evaluation of precarious work from each 
of five studied sectors across 10 EU Member States. It serves as an analytical tool to 
review sectoral differences in the most important forms and trends in precarious 
employment. Finally, this matrix-based approach serves as a background for the next 
part in the analysis – identifying and comparing social partner responses to particular 
dimensions of precarious work.  
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Table 1: Dimensions of precariousness 
  Quality of working conditions dimension 
 
Regulated 
by: 
 Wages Working 
time 
Job 
security 
Social 
security 
Repre-
zentation 
(voice) 
T
h
e 
fo
rm
a
l 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
st
a
tu
s 
d
im
en
si
o
n
 
Labour 
Code 
Full-time 
open-ended 
contract 
     
Fixed-term 
contract 
 
     
Part-time 
contract 
     
Work 
agreements 
     
TAW      
Non 
Labour 
Code 
Self-
employment, 
bogus self-
employment 
     
Civil contracts      
Business 
contracts 
     
Others      
 
Table 1 covers the five dimensions of precariousness used to evaluate the extent of 
precariousness or exposure to precariousness in the different types of formal 
employment relationships. We categorised the employment forms into two categories, 
namely those regulated by the Labour Code and those regulated by other legal acts. 
By and large, contracts based on Labour Code are contracts of service, while non-
Labour code work are contracts for services, which commonly provide less protection 
for workers than those regulated by the Labour Code. Each national team got the 
following guidelines seeking to identify comparable data on whether or not a job 
quality dimension is precarious:   
 Wages: indicate whether/how the particular employment form is precarious 
from the point of view of wages/pay. If data is available, list the share of 
persons on minimum wage and on low wages (the benchmark is 
approximately two-thirds of the median wage. Given the data problem, no 
strict following of the two-thirds benchmark is required). 
 Working time: evaluate how the employment forms listed in the left column 
are precarious from the working time perspective. If possible, provide data on: 
excessive overtime, unpaid overtime, (exposure to) irregular working hours, 
working time accounts or annual working hours that make working time 
unpredictable. 
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 Job security: evaluate precariousness of particular employment forms 
according to the job security dimension: e.g., short dismissal periods, repeated 
fixed-term employment without a perspective of regular long-term 
employment contracts, increase of probation periods, uncertainty related to 
outsourcing/insourcing in case of temporary agency work (TAW) or other 
forms of contracts. 
 Social security: exposure to precariousness based on whether comparable 
social security payments and entitlements are made as in the case of a standard 
employment contract, e.g., full pension rights, full sickness leave rights, 
maternity payment rights, rights for unemployment benefits, the reference 
income for social security entitlements (e.g. in case of minimum wage and 
envelope payments, the entitlements are based only on the minimum wage), 
and similar entitlements. 
 Representation of interests (voice): whether employees with a particular 
type of contract are represented by trade unions, shop stewards, or other 
similar interest representation organizations. 
The focus on the selected five dimensions of quality of work facilitates the analysis of 
the findings in relation to whether employers use external and/or internal flexibility to 
increase work precariousness. External flexibility refers to the easiness with which the 
number of workers employed can be adapted to meet fluctuations in demand and is 
primarily associated with  non-standard employment contracts (Paolucci, 2016). In 
the main, external flexibility is achieved by using ‘subordinate’ forms of employment 
as compared to the standard full-time, open-ended contract, such as part-time, 
temporary, casual, subcontracted work or self-employed (Streeck, 1987). While 
precariousness emerges more prominently in relation to 'job security', other job 
quality dimensions may also be affected by the use of non-standard contracts. These 
effects could be linked to legal stipulations (e.g. self-employed may not be entitled to 
social security or to be represented by a union) as well as joint regulations by the 
social partners (e.g. the exclusion of temporary workers from collective agreements).  
In contrast, internal flexibility refers to variations in the tasks and working time 
arrangements for employees on standard contracts. It refers to numerical flexibility 
through overtime, shift-work or guaranteed working annual working-time 
arrangements, adjustments in the amount of labour utilized in accordance with 
cyclical or seasonal shifts within a standard employment relationship (Streeck, 1987). 
It is also associated with ‘functional flexibility’ referring to the easiness with which 
the tasks carried out by employees can be adapted to changes in demands. Important 
aspects of this are redeployment and retraining, which require institutions and 
payment systems that motivate workers to take over new tasks, acquire new 
qualifications, and generally, accept continuous fast adjustments in the organisation of 
work (Paolucci, 2016). The use of internal flexibility generally does not affect job 
security, but it may increase the precariousness of other job quality dimensions, such 
as working time (irregular work schedule) or increase workload without an increase in 
wages.  Internal flexibility may reduce the need for external flexibility, but they are 
not necessary mutually exclusive (Streek, 1987). The comparative report examines 
whether employers utilize internal and/or external flexibility in the five selected 
sectors. 
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1.4 Analytical framework on social partners’ actions  
Besides comparing forms and incidence of precarious employment across five sectors 
in 10 EU Member States, the project analyses the attitudes, strategies and actions of 
social partners vis-à-vis precarious employment in their respective sectors. In an 
attempt to operationalize social partner strategies/actions, we distinguish between 
trade unions’ and employers’ strategies and actions. This derives from the assumption 
that unions and employers may have different interests regarding the growth of 
precarious employment forms, and therefore may engage in different actions. We 
focus on intended strategies/actions of social partners and consider unintended 
consequences of their actions only where obvious and relevant for evaluating their 
overall strategy and actions undertaken. 
1.4.1 Trade unions’ actions vis-à-vis precarious work 
The aim of this section is to operationalize the role of trade unions in addressing the 
economic and social rights of precarious workers as well as the overall implications of 
unions’ actions on precarious work, ranging from its elimination to its retention. The 
analytical framework on trade union approaches and actions comprises four related 
steps. We perceive union action to be informed by the overall rationales of union 
existence in the society, operationalized by the unions’ adopted approach towards 
precarious work, instruments chosen for union action in order to meet the selected 
approach and the implications that union action yields for the current and future 
existence of precarious work (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1:  Analytical framework for studying the role of trade union in shaping 
precarious employment 
 
WHY?                  WHAT?  HOW?        IMPLICATIONS 
Rationales            Approaches  Instruments         Purpose of action 
for union action          of unions to action       used for action        regarding  
                  precarious work   
    
Trade unions’ rationales                            
First, we consider the overall rationales of union approaches and actions, derived 
from the generalized roles of trade unions in a society. Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
argued that the collective voice and the institutional response of trade unions serve 
three kinds of rationale for union action, namely, efficiency, equality, and social 
legitimacy.  
First, the efficiency rationale relates to wage growth stipulated through trade union 
actions, which feed to questions of productivity and competitiveness as key factors for 
economic growth (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Wage growth may stimulate 
improved commitment of employees, productivity, purchasing power and the quality 
of life. Within this rationale, we expect unions to adopt particular approaches to 
dealing with precarious work (see sections 1.4.1.2 and 1.4.1.3). 
Second, the equality rationale relates to unions as actors possibly facilitating equality 
in society through regulation of working conditions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). In 
relation to precarious work, the equality rationale is directly linked to issues of labour 
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market segmentation or dualization comprising ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010). Trade unions may alter the distribution of power, income, and 
regulatory measures to intensify or to decrease such segmentation or dualization. 
Third, the social legitimacy rationale for trade unions comprises democratic interest 
representation with attempts to represent diverse parts of the society and gain trust 
and acceptance of such interest representation by the population. The recent history of 
CEE countries suggests only limited exposure to democratic interest representation 
prior to 1989 and its formation only during the 1990s and 2000s. Post-socialism 
encouraged  shifts that ‘have remade social networks, communities, and institutions, 
positively and negatively, as some have been eroded by poverty and inequality and 
others have emerged from new opportunities and new connections’ (Stenning et al., 
2010: 7). Within this rationale, trade unions may develop particular approaches to 
handling precarious work. 
For the purposes of our project, we also include a fourth union rationale e.g. union 
survival, which is adapted specifically to post-socialist conditions of CEE countries or 
countries undergoing a severe transition (Greece). We argue that in hostile conditions, 
union survival can be a rationale for union action in itself, without the necessity to 
seek connections to the union rationales listed in the literature above. The rationale of 
union survival motivates trade unions to seek new opportunities for interest 
representation and for work regulation. Thereby union survival brings with itself a set 
of approaches, instruments and intended or unintended consequences for precarious 
work forms. 
 Trade unions’ approaches  
After acknowledging why unions are doing what they are doing (union rationales), the 
next step in building our analytical framework derives from the question ‘what’ 
unions actually want to achieve with their action vis-à-vis precarious workers. Here 
we distinguish between several union approaches to precarious workers as a core 
stakeholder group exposed to non-standard working forms and at the same time being 
the core target group of union actions. Earlier literature has called these ‘union 
strategies’, but we prefer to use the broader term ‘union approaches’ to precarious 
work to highlight the general stances of unions towards precarious workers with 
respect to existing forms and incidences of precarious work in the society. We draw 
on Heery and Abbott (2000) definitions of trade union strategies vis-à-vis contingent 
workforce: 
• Inclusion: unions serve as broad interest representation organizations without 
differentiation between precarious and regular workers. 
• Separation: unions treat precarious workers as a particular group within 
union members that requires dedicated attention and action.  
• Exclusion: unions exclude precarious workers from their interests. 
• Reduction: unions strive to influence and implement changes in employment 
conditions of precarious employees to minimize the gap in employment 
conditions of precarious and regular employees. 
• Elimination: unions strive for eliminating all forms of precarious work in the 
economy. Inclusion and separation may serve as temporary strategies towards 
elimination. 
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For the purpose of our project, we adjust these analytical categories and 
operationalize union approaches to precarious workers as varying from inclusion to 
exclusion, with separation playing a role as a strategy between inclusion and 
exclusion. Next, we view elimination, reduction, and the retention of status quo 
incidence of precarious work as the implication of union approaches for the incidence 
of precarious work (see section 4.1.4). This adaptation of the Heery and Abbott 
(2000) framework allows us to operationalize union approaches vis-à-vis precarious 
work as shown in Figure 2:  
Figure 2: Trade union approaches to precarious workers and implications for the  
incidence of precarious work 
 
Approaches 
Inclusion 
Separation 
Exclusion 
                           Retention                                    Reduction                         Elimination           
                                              Implications for precarious work 
 
Trade unions’ instruments 
Having identified trade union approaches and their implications, the third step in 
developing our analytical framework is distinguishing between the forms of action 
that unions have at their disposal in order to reach their goals set out in the adopted 
approaches vis-à-vis precarious work. Keune (2011) and Boonstra, Keune and 
Verhulp (2011) distinguish five main instruments at the disposal of unions to deal 
with precarious work:  
• Collective bargaining: addressing precarious work in collective agreements 
to improve the terms and conditions of precarious workers; 
• Litigation: taking precarious employment cases to court in order to enforce 
the established employment regulation; includes monitoring, reporting and 
formal litigation 
• Political instruments: political lobbying, trade-offs, open/formal as well as 
informal alliances with political parties and social dialogue in order to 
influence the legislative process at a central level to improve the legal rights of 
precarious workers; 
• Mobilizing and organizing precarious workers in trade unions: unions 
organize protests, manifestations, strikes, etc to highlight the rights of 
precarious workers regardless of their union membership. 
• Media campaigns to influence public opinion: unions use the media to 
channel their claims, concerns, opinions and attempts to shape public opinion 
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In addition, the following three instruments may serve as an additional toolkit for 
unions to influence the economic and social rights of precarious employees and the 
regulation of precarious work: 
• Service-oriented instruments: empowerment, information on rights and 
employment situation 
• Identity politics: information campaigns, media appearances, involvement 
in discussions and other similar actions to influence the self-recognition of 
precarious employees and supporting their empowerment  
• Building and disseminating benchmarks on employment standards in 
the society: similar to identity politics, unions engage in information 
campaigns on decent work, media appearances, discussions and related 
actions to influence the general perception of standard employment in the 
society and thus setting benchmarks for what is standard and what is 
precarious.  
We divide these instruments into four overarching sets that cover processes of 
information, consultation, negotiation and organizing and industrial action. These 
instruments range from information that unions provide to members and non-
members, through consultation and negotiation with employers, government and other 
stakeholders, to organizing precarious and other workers in unions and industrial 
action (see Table 2). These instruments serve as a toolbox for trade unions to 
implement their approaches towards precarious work vis-à-vis various target groups. 
The list of instruments is not exhaustive, but gives an analytical anchor to country-
specific analyses in five sectors across 10 EU Member States. 
Table 2: Instruments to implement unions’ approaches to precarious work  
Category Target groups of union 
action 
Instruments 
Information Precarious workers Informal campaigns, service-oriented 
instruments, individual empowerment 
Precarious workers Identity politics 
Public Media 
Public, employers, other 
trade unions 
Shaping benchmarks on employment standards 
Consultation Precarious workers, other 
unions 
Services for empowerment 
Government, employers Consultation and advice on legislation 
Negotiation Government, political 
parties, other unions 
Political lobbying  
Employers Collective bargaining 
Organizing and 
industrial action 
Precarious workers Litigation 
Precarious workers, the 
public 
Organization 
Precarious workers, other 
unions 
Mobilization 
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Implications of unions’ approaches and action for precarious work 
The final building block of the analytical framework focuses on the implications of 
trade union actions on precarious work. We study to what extent trade union actions 
empirically documented in the studied countries and sectors contribute to elimination, 
reduction, or retention of the status quo in precarious work forms.   
 
1.4.2 Employers’ associations (and their members) actions vis-à-vis precarious work  
In the context of the rise of precarious work, the debate has been predominantly one-
sided in as much as some institutional actors, e.g. trade unions, have been featured 
extensively while others, e.g. employers’ associations and individual employers, have 
been much less prominent. With respect to the lack of emphasis on employers’ 
associations, this arguably reflects the historical focus of the industrial relations 
community on the role of trade unions and the respective lack of emphasis on 
employer coordination (Barry and Wilkinson 2011). More recently, employers’ 
associations, like unions, have been affected negatively by structural changes to the 
economy that make organizing more difficult – such as the growth of employment in 
small firms in the service sector and shrinkage in large scale manufacturing (Traxler 
2008: 237). But the role of employers’ associations in the ongoing changes to 
industrial relations systems, including those related to the rise of precarious work, 
cannot be overemphasized. The need for firms to seek to combine and coordinate 
their actions to countervail employee power may be particularly strong during periods 
of economic and product market decline, where any contest over union market power 
is a contest over the division of profits (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011: 157, quoting 
Galbraith 1852).  
In considering the role of employers’ associations in dealing with issues related to 
precarious work, it is important first to acknowledge the reasons for the formation of 
such forms of coordination among employers. Three reasons have been advanced: the 
first is the need for employers to combine resources and power to counter the growing 
power of unions; the second is to seek to influence or to respond to government 
regulation; and the third is to attempt to manage competition among employers (Barry 
and Wilkinson, 2011).  
Aside from paying attention to the organization of employers’ associations internally, 
the relationship of employers’ associations with the other industrial relations actors, 
e.g. the state and trade unions, is also crucial here. As Traxler has shown, the strength 
of organized business is heavily contingent on state regulation:  
‘on the one hand, the need of the authorities to involve organized business in public policy 
increases with its bargaining power. On the other hand, the state creates this need by 
butressing the membership base and the bargaining role of organized business through the 
provision of extension schemes’ (Traxler, 2010: 167). 
The support of strong interlocateurs in the form of trade unions is also important here 
(Streeck, 1987: 283). As such, changes in the regulatory capacities of each of these 
actors will have a bearing on employers’ associations themselves.  
The economic crisis provides an excellent ground to explore these issues. First of all, 
a number of industrial relations systems have undergone wide-ranging and far-
reaching changes in labour market regulations as a result of austerity measures. In-
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depth structural labour market measures have been implemented that are aimed not 
only at ensuring wage moderation but also at amending essential features of the 
industrial relations systems via changes in employment protection legislation and 
collective bargaining. In undermining the role of joint regulation by governments, the 
austerity measures have fundamentally challenged the regulatory capacities of 
employers’ associations vis-à-vis other actors, mainly trade unions (Koukiadaki et al, 
2016).  
Recent work by Sheldon et al. (2014) found that bargaining decentralization trends 
can foster the emergence and elevated profile of competitors for associations through 
the rise of Human Resource Management (HRM) within companies and externally 
through the use of specialized legal practices and consultancies. In this respect, 
periods of crisis may throw new light on the role of employers’ associations internally 
as well. In his seminal analysis of employers and industrial change, Streeck argued 
that in times of crisis, new developments in industrial relations, if any, will be 
dependent on entrepreneurs and not on the politicians of industrial relations: ‘the 
collective interests of employers, and the objectives employers’ associations are 
permitted to pursue, consist of little more than the freedom for individual firms to 
develop and pursue their own strategies’ (Streeck, 1987: 283). Again, this has been 
evident in industrial relations systems mostly affected by the austerity measures, e.g. 
Greece and Romania, where interest aggregation has been biased towards the interests 
of large firms (in the case of Greece) and multinationals (in the case of Romania) 
(Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 2016; Trif, 2016). History has shown that in times of 
crisis the initiative in industrial relations shifts to the employers (Strauss, 1984). 
While this is the case, policy-level debates tend to focus predominantly on issues of 
organizational flexibility neglecting the implications of these for precarious work. As 
Rubery (2015) has recently argued, the policy debate around precarious work has 
largely concentrated on the role of social policy and has neglected the macro 
economic linkages between employment and social protection, reducing thus the 
function of employment regulation to that of social protection: ‘in doing so, it lets 
employers who still remain the architects of employment arrangements off the hook 
by giving up direct attempts to change employer behaviour’. It is employers that are 
responsible as the core agents for deciding on the terms of employment engagement: 
it is employers’ selection, investment and retention decisions that create segmented or 
divided labour markets (Osterman, 1994; Rubery, 2007). These divisions may be 
influenced by various forms of social stratification but it is employers’ actions that 
reinforce and reproduce these divisions by, for example, restricting employment 
opportunities for those who do not conform to the ideal-type underpinning of the 
standard employment relationship concept of an independent and fully fit adult 
(Rubery, 2015). In emphasizing the role of employers, this approach contrasts 
significantly with the European flexicurity policy, which regards motivating 
employees to retrain as the main issue (Rubery, 2015).  
Against this context, employers and their associations may react in specific ways to 
changes affecting precarious work (see Figure 3).   
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Figure 3: Analytical framework for studying the role of employers’ associations’ 
(and their members’) in shaping precarious employment 
 
WHY?                  WHAT?    HOW?        IMPLICATIONS 
Rationales            Approaches    Instruments         Purpose of action 
for employer action    of employers to action   used for action      regarding  
                  precarious work   
 
Rationales for employers’ actions 
Bearing in mind the issues discussed above and in order to assess the role of 
employers and their associations in the rise of a dual labour market, it is important to 
then identify the considerations that firms may have in terms of the use of non-
standard forms of work. At a broad level, a company’s decision to engage in non-
standard work will be influenced by its specific attributes, such as size, the industry in 
which it operates, the skill level of its workforce, its proprietary knowledge, the 
practices of competing enterprises, and the regulatory framework of the country in 
which it operates (ILO, 2015). The present study identifies four sets of rationales that 
may be taken into account by employers when dealing with the issue of precarious 
work (see Table 3). These are not independent rationales and organizations may adopt 
a specific approach to non-standard work for any one, or a combination, of these 
reasons.  
Table 3: Employers’ associations’ (and their members’) rationales regarding the 
use of precarious work  
Rationales  Themes  
Economic  
 Cost leadership strategy: labour costs as being the most important source of 
competitive advantage 
 Differentiation and innovation strategies: labour costs being treated among 
other sources of competitive advantage  
Institutional 
(regulatory 
and moral) 
 Regulatory 
 Normative 
 Cultural cognitive 
Social  
Social legitimacy and accountability to different stakeholder groups, including most 
notably:  
 Consumers 
 (prospective) Employees 
 Local community 
 Governments  
Organizational  
Arrangements being dependent on a number of considerations, including most 
notably:  
 Numerical flexibility 
 Functional flexibility  
 Production markets  
 Labour markets  
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The first set of criteria will be based on economic considerations. The economics of 
capitalist firms are governed by the need to realize a profit (Streeck, 1987: 283). In 
this context, employers may engage in an analysis designed to assess the costs 
associated with choosing among different strategies and actions vis-a-vis precarious 
work. The work of Porter (2004) on the firms’ competitive advantage may be helpful 
here (e.g. the distinction between cost reduction, quality enhancement and innovation 
strategies). At one extreme, firms may tend to rely on low labour costs to get a 
competitive advantage (e.g. in low-wage sectors, such as retail); this will then imply 
that employers will be in favour of promoting precarious forms of employment and 
will attempt in turn to influence their employers’ association towards supporting such 
form of work at sectoral and higher levels.  
At the other extreme, employers may wish to regulate and limit even the use of such 
forms of work when faced, for instance, with different conditions in product markets 
that emphasize investments in quality. In this case, they will be incentivised to seek 
the support of unions as active partners in reducing the prospect of competition on the 
basis of wages, the primary means being here the conclusion of collective agreements 
at higher sectoral/occupational or even cross-sectoral levels. It may be the case that 
differentiation here may be observed between large and small employers: large 
employers may seek to impose standard terms and conditions on their smaller 
competitors as a means to control market share (Silvia and Scroeder, 2007). 
Alternatively, no significant differences may exist between large and small firms: 
whilst large firms with internal labour markets may segment their employment 
systems with a view to reducing the costs of employer-provided benefits (Kalleberg, 
2009), increases in the number of small and medium enterprises may mean that a 
common strategy between large and small firms may be possible.   
The second set of criteria will be based on institutional considerations. In this respect, 
a distinction between ‘regulative’, ‘normative’ and ‘cultural cognitive’ aspects is 
considered (Scott, 2008: 50-59). The ‘regulative’ aspect refers directly to labour rights 
established in legislation; these will include those not only applicable to individuals 
engaged in precarious work but also those applicable to standard  employment 
relationships, as the interaction between the two is important as well. At one extreme, 
a number of employers will be incentivized to comply with labour law. In this respect, 
consideration would be given also to the role of the state, in the form of enforcement 
authorities, resources for monitoring and access to justice by individuals/trade unions. 
At the other extreme, there may be cases of employers who (consciously) fail to 
comply as a means to gain a competitive advantage over other employers. Often, 
labour rights are no more than reflections of normative patterns (Purcell, 2012: 163). 
In his comparative work on precarious work, Barbier (2004) emphasized the 
importance of the ‘normative system’ expressed in regulations, collective agreements 
and firm practices. In this context, the issue of ‘moral economy’ (Granovetter, 2005: 
433) may be also relevant here, especially when considering the role of employers’ 
associations. This is because the extent to which members of the employers’ 
associations have a strong sense of moral obligation to other members and a well-
defined conception of what is proper behaviour with respect to the use of precarious 
forms of work will play a role when contemplating or acting upon issues related to 
precarious work. Finally, rules and norms regarding precarious work must be backed 
up by cultural beliefs to be viable. Hence, common beliefs, shared logics of action and 
isomorphism with respect, among others, to the use of precarious work by certain 
socio-economic categories and firm types  will be important.  
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The third set of criteria will be based on social considerations. In this respect, the 
main consideration is centred around the notion of social legitimacy, e.g. ‘the need for 
employers to be seen to be ‘good citizens’ and to be concerned that accusations of 
poor conduct can have a deleterious impact on consumer choice, including gaining 
government contracts, and the ability to recruit and retain the most effective 
employees’ (Purcell, 2012: 163). As such, social legitimacy focuses on the range of 
stakeholders (e.g. which range from governments to prospective employees and 
consumers) that may be affected by and have an interest in the way organizations 
manage their workforce. At one extreme, employers may have an interest in 
maintaining their social legitimacy among those groups: this will be the case in 
sectors that may be exposed to ‘name and shame’ campaigns and other forms of 
social and civil mobilization on the part of unions, consumers and other stakeholder 
groups etc. (potentially) affecting reputation and trade. In the case of employers 
relying on government contracts, the existence of public procurement regulations that 
promote the incorporation of social clauses in procurement may have similar effects, 
e.g. force employers to pay attention to issues of working conditions. At the other 
extreme, social motivations may not be a significant consideration where firms are not 
(or do not perceive to be) at great risk of being exposed to poor working practices, 
e.g. where their reputation relies on low-value products/services or where the supply 
chain is so complex so as to lack transparency with respect to working practices (e.g. 
in the case of MNCs). Lack of attention to social legitimacy may not be deliberate, as 
competitive pressures and cost-pressures may have the effect of overriding processes 
designed to implement employment rights and marginalising labour standards 
(Purcell, 2012: 161).  
The fourth set of criteria will concern organizational considerations. Evidence 
suggests that organizations use non-standard workers to attain numerical or functional 
flexibility. Workers are brought in at short notice to help the organization deal with 
seasonal demand (Harrison and Kelley, 1993) or with fluctuations in labour supply 
(Ko, 2003). But with shorter product cycles arising from just-in-time production, the 
ability to hire workers for short time periods provides organizations with numerical 
flexibility, enabling them to expand (or reduce) their workforce fairly rapidly. 
Organizations also attain functional flexibility when they are able to hire workers to 
deal with specific, typically short-term needs requiring special skills not available in-
house (Kalleberg et al., 2003). Further, depending on the strategy adopted (see above 
economic considerations), employers may want to limit transactions costs that may 
arise from dealing repeatedly with renewals of non-standard contracts and the 
provision of training (e.g. in sectors where higher-levels of skills and the provision of 
training are required) and reduce the risk of conflict at workplace level. 
Employers’ approaches towards precarious workers 
Driven by these sets of considerations, employers’ associations and employers will 
respond in particular ways to the rise of non-standard work. As seen in Figure 4, these 
match those of the trade unions, as explained above. While in some cases employers 
and their associations may develop specific initiatives, it is important to acknowledge 
here that, ‘the notion of ‘initiative’ implies an element of strategic freedom which 
employers, under the imperatives of profitability and the need to keep control over the 
labour force, may just not have. Moreover, employers like any other social group may 
act either as individuals or as a collectivity, and the mode of action is likely to make a 
difference both for the objectives pursued and the resources available’ (Streeck 1987).  
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Figure 4: Employers’ associations’ (and their members’) approaches towards 
precarious workers and implications for incidence of precarious work 
Approaches 
Inclusion 
Separation 
Exclusion 
                           Expansion            Status quo           Reduction             Elimination          
Implications for precarious work  
 
Employers’associations (and their members) instruments to implement approaches  
Based on the above considerations and options, we define the following sets of 
instruments (see Table 4) that employers have available as a toolbox for 
implementing their approaches and influencing the existence of precarious work 
forms (see Figure 4).  
Table 4: Employers’ associations’ (and their members’) instruments to 
implement strategies 
Category Target groups of union 
action 
Instruments 
Information Other employers Informal coordination, gentlemen agreements on 
employer strategies 
Other employers Identity politics – seeking support why more 
flexibility is needed 
Public Media – campaigns for more flexibility (less 
likely than in the case of trade unions) 
Government, other 
relevant stakeholders 
(civil society) 
Shaping benchmarks on employment standards – 
why more flexibility is needed 
Consultation Other employers Meetings, joint statements, coordination of 
action 
Government, trade unions Consultation and advice on legislation 
Negotiation Government, political 
parties, trade unions, other 
employers 
Political lobbying for/against expansion of 
precarious work, for/against diverse forms of 
non-standard work, for/against new kinds of 
legislative instruments regulating precarious 
work 
Trade unions Collective bargaining 
Organizing (other) 
employers 
Other employers 
 
Litigation – legal compliance 
Organization in employers’ associations 
Mobilization 
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1.5 Concluding remarks  
The analytical framework provides a comparative way to account for the most 
relevant sector-specific and national-level developments in incidences, forms and 
regulations of precarious employment forms as well as the responses, strategies, 
actions and instruments of the social partners. Apart from job security dimension that 
differenciates between standard and non-standard employement relationships, this 
study investigates whether or not wages, working time, social security and 
employees’ voice are precarious for workers on all forms of contracts, including those 
on standard employment contracts. By exploring whether those five quality of 
working conditions dimensions are precarios independent of the type of contract, this 
study goes beyond the equating precarious work with non-standard employment 
contracts.  
In addition, it conceptualises the rationales, approaches and instruments used by trade 
unions and employers’ associations (and their members) to deal with precarious 
employment. In doing this, it broadens the existing conceptual frameworks that tend 
to be predominantly one-sided in as much as some institutional actors, e.g. trade 
unions, have been featured extensively while others, e.g. employers’ associations and 
individual employers, have been much less prominent. It argues that whilst both 
social partners have broadly similar rationales (economic, institutional, social and 
organizational) for dealing with precarious work, differences exist in terms of the 
degree of influence of these rationales upon specific strategies and actions. 
Furthermore, social partners have comparable approaches towards precarious works 
varying from elimination (more likely to be advocated by trade unions), to retaining 
the status quo or expansion (more likely to be advocated by employers) as well as 
similar instruments to implement their approaches varying from information, 
consultation, negotiation and organizing their members. Apart from enabling a 
qualitative account on comparative developments, it contributes to a better 
understanding of the actions of both social partners vis-à-vis precarious work, as it 
will be seen in the analysis of cross-national findings in the next three chapters. 
 
 23 
Chapter 2: Incidence of precarious work across countries 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This project investigates the role of industrial relations in addressing precarious work. It focuses 
on the initiatives and responses that trade unions and employers’ associations developed to deal 
with precarious work in Croatia, the Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia since 2008. Nine of these ten EU members share a similar post-
socialist legacy and transition to democracy and market economy in the course of 1990s. At the 
same time, they also reflect the diversity of industrial relations systems and precarious 
employment across the CEE region (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). The institutional arrangements 
cover the entire spectrum of varieties of capitalism:  
 (a) neo-liberal countries group consist of Latvia and Lithuania as well as Romania and 
Croatia; those countries are characterized by weakly established or enforced tripartite 
institutions and fragmented bargaining; nevertheless, as collective bargaining coverage 
and union density are higher in Romania and Croatia compared to the Baltic states, 
Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that the last two countries have a special type of neo-
liberalism. 
  (b) embedded liberalism group consists of the Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; 
these Visegrad countries have strongly entrenched tripartism, institutions for collective 
bargaining and employee representation. Czechia and Slovakia tend to have greater 
tradition in social dialogue and a higher level of bargaining coordination than Poland and 
Hungary; respectively, Hungary and Poland have decentralized and low collective 
bargaining coverage.  
 (c) neo-corporatism in Slovenia, which still has a degree of corporatist industrial 
relations arrangements, with coordinated bargaining, employee representation, social 
pacts and bargaining coverage (European Commission, 2012; Stanojević and Kanjuo 
Mrčela, 2016).  
 (d) state-centred market economy in Greece; in contrast to most CEE countries, 
industrial relations in Greece before the crisis were highly structured and collectivized. 
At the same time, there was a growing proportion of workers that were unprotected by 
the collective bargaining system and labour legislation (Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). 
Against this context, the profound sovereign debt crisis and extensive labour market 
reforms that have recently taken place have led to dramatic changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment as well as the collective bargaining institutions with 
implications for the extent and nature of the dual labour market (Koukiadaki and 
Kokkinou, 2016).  
This project seeks to benchmark the social partner responses to precarious employment in the 
new EU Member States against developments in Greece, where social partners traditionally 
enjoyed greater mobilization and bargaining capacities. Nevertheless, Greece was the worst hit 
by the 2008 crisis. Consequently, the developments in precarious work in the nine new EU 
Member States will be benchmarked against the ‘worst case scenario’ in the old Member States 
concerning the effects of the 2008 crisis.  
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In each country, the study analysed developments in five sectors, namely public healthcare, the 
metal industry, construction, retail and TAW. The project used a qualitative approach to examine 
the dimensions of precarious employment, including low pay, irregular working hours, low job 
security and limited representation of workers’ rights. Key informants representing trade unions, 
employers and other specialists were interviewed in each country to find out their views on how 
the social partners deal with precarious work in the selected sectors. The total number of 
interviews in each country varied between 10 in Slovenia (where there is less fragmentation of 
social partners) to 21 in Romania (Table 5). In-depth interviews were conducted mostly in 2015 
with sectoral representatives of both trade unions and employers in the five sectors, where 
sectoral trade unions and/or employers’ associations existed. If not, national level or other 
experts were interviewed. 168 interviews were conducted in total across the 10 countries (Table 
5); over 20 respondents were interviewed in each of the five selected sectors; these were 
supplemented by 40 interviews conducted at the national level.  
Table 5: Summary of the number of interviews 
Country/ 
Sector 
Construc
-tion 
Healthcare Metal Retail TAW 
Across sectors/  
National level 
Total 
Croatia 2 1 3 3 1 6 16 
Czechia 2 3 3 2 3 2 15 
Greece 2 3 2 3 3 6 19 
Hungary  2 3 3 2 3 4 17 
Latvia 3 3 3 3 2 4 18 
Lithuania 3 4 1 1 0 6 15 
Poland 3 3 3 4 2 5 20 
Romania 3 3 3 3 2 7 21 
Slovakia 2 6 3 2 4 0 17 
Slovenia 2 2 2 2 2 0 10 
Total 24 31 26 25 22 40 168 
 
The comparative report is based on the findings reported in the national reports. While it 
addresses similar aspects as the national reports, the comparative report focuses on similarities 
and differences across countries. The comparative findings are streamlined into three themes, 
namely (1) the incidence of precarious work, (2) trade unions and precarious work and (3) 
employers and precarious work.   
 
2.2 Incidence and forms of precarious work across countries 
The first objective of the project is to identify and discuss developments in precarious work in 
the new EU Member States and Greece, as there is very limited previous research on precarious 
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work in these countries. In a context of labour market deregulation following the 2008 crisis 
(Koukiadaki at al., 2016; Marginson, 2015), it was expected that that employers would use their 
new prerogatives to reduce labour costs by increasing the share of non-standard contracts 
(outsiders), respectively reducing the share of standard contracts (insiders). This was reflected by 
the title of the project entitled ‘The rise of the dual labour market: fighting precarious 
employment in the new Member States through industrial relations’. Nevertheless, post-2008 
labour market deregulation has also reduced the employment protection for employees on 
standard contracts in most EU countries (Koukiadaki at al., 2016; Marginson, 2015) primarily by 
increasing employers’ prerogatives to use more flexibile working time arrangements. Thus, it is 
unknown whether the labour market deregulation led to increased dualization between insiders 
and outsiders.  
 
2.2.1 Post-2008 changes in the regulatory framework 
Post-2008 legal changes combined with a reduction of joint regulation by social partners have 
increased the prerogatives of employers to use internal flexibility for employees on standard 
contracts in virtually all countries investigates (Table 6). First, the decline in individual 
employment rights gives employers more control over work schedule, ranging from making it 
easier to use overtime to irregular working hours. The recent legislation allows employers to 
increase or decrease the number of working hours per week contingent on employers’ needs for 
standard employees (e.g. Greece and Romania). Also, it allows seasonal or annual time account 
(e.g. Czechia and Slovakia). Second, the reduction of collective rights in Croatia (to organise and 
bargain collectively), Greece (to organise, to bargain collectively and strike), Hungary (to strike, 
to bargain collectively and the abolition of a tripartite forum for conciliation), Romania (to 
organise, to bargain collectively and to strike) and Slovakia (limitation of union rights) have also 
provided employers more control over working time and wages (Table 6). Third, the job security 
of employees on standard contracts was reduced by legal changes that make it easier for 
employers to hire and fire employees in seven countries (except Croatia, Poland and Slovakia) 
(Table 6). Thus, the undermining of individual rights in all countries and collective rights in five 
(out of the 10 countries) has given employers more prerogatives to use internal flexibility, by 
reducing the protection of employees on standard contracts, particularly concerning wages, 
working time and job security (Table 6).  
 
 
  
26 
 
Table 6: Trends in employment protection legislation post-2008 across countries 
  Standard contract (St) Non-standard (N-St) Overall 
Country  
Changes in individual 
and/or collective rights 
What job quality 
dimensions are affected 
by legal changes? 
(dimensions affected most 
in bold) 
Changes in individual and/or collective 
rights 
What job quality dimensions 
are affected by legal changes? 
(dimensions affected most in 
bold) 
Changes in internal 
and external 
flexibility  
Croatia 
↓ Individual rights (↓ social 
benefits  ↓ working-time ) 
↓Collective rights (freedom 
to organise, bargain) 
↓ protection of (b) working 
time;  (d) social benefits 
and (e) voice  
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope for part-
time, seasonal work, TAW)  increased E 
control over wage for part-timers;  ↑  
Individual rights (scope and duration of 
fixed-term) 
↓  protection of (a) wages; (b) 
working-time ↑ protection of (c 
) job security;   
↑Internal flexibility  
↓External Flexibility 
Czechia 
↓ Individual rights (↓ hiring 
and firing,  ↓working-time )  
↓ protection of (a) wages; 
(b) working time;  (c ) job 
security   
↓Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts; ↑ working time for 
work agreements ) ; 
↑Individual rights (↑ social security for 
work agreements - still very precarious; 
TAW law - still below EU directive 
standards)   
↓  protection of (b) working-
time - maximum duration; (c ) 
job security;  ↑ protection of (d) 
social benefits 
↑ Internal and 
↑external flexibility 
Greece 
↓ Individual rights (↓ wage 
levels , easier to hire and fire, 
irregular working-time ) 
↓Collective rights (freedom 
to organise, bargain and 
strike) 
↓ protection of (a) wages; 
(b) working time;  - 
increased E control over 
work schedule & overtime; 
(c) job security and (e) 
voice  
↓Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts; reduced hourly rate for 
part-timers)  Fixed-term not in line with 
EU directives ↓ Collective (TAW not 
entitled to bargain) 
↓  protection of (a) wages; (b) 
working-time - maximum 
duration; (c ) job security;  (e ) 
voice  
↑ Internal and 
↑external flexibility 
Hungary 
↓ Individual rights (↓ hiring 
and firing for PA) 
↓Collective rights (abolition 
of tripartite forum for 
conciliation, freedom to 
strike, CA can derogate the 
LC in PA) 
↓ protection of (a) job 
security; (e) voice - 
increased E control over 
work schedule & overtime 
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts)  TAW and Fixed-term 
not in line with EU directives 
↓  protection of all dimensions 
(non-standard work is abused - 
not respectful of EU directives)  
↑ Internal and 
↑external flexibility 
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Latvia 
↑ Individual rights (EU 
directive on working-time) - 
the standard contract is 
abused 
↑Individual rights (b) 
working-time (c ) job 
security 
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts)  ↑ Individual rights 
(↑EU directive on TAW) ↑ Collective 
(EU directive on collective redundancies) 
 protection of (c) job security ↓ 
(scope and duration of N-St 
contract)↑ (EU directive on 
TAW); ↑  (e) voice (EU 
directive on collective 
redundancies) 
= 
Lithuania 
↓ Individual rights (↓hiring 
and firing - a reform of 
dismissal procedures is under 
consideration) 
↓ protection of (c) job 
security   
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts) ↑ TAW law  
 protection of (c) job security ↓ 
(scope and duration of N-St 
contracts) ↑ (EU directive on 
TAW)  ;  
↑ external flexibility 
Poland 
↓ Individual rights (↑  
flexible working time)  
↓ protection of (b) working 
time  
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts)  ↑ TAW law to reduce 
consecutive contracts 
↓ protection of (c) job security;  
↑ Internal and 
↑external flexibility 
Romania 
↓ Individual rights (↓ hiring 
and firing, ↑ irregular 
working time and 
↑workload) and ↓collective 
rights (↓ to organise, bargain 
and strike) since 2011 
↓ protection of (a) wages; 
(b) working time - 
increased E control over 
work schedule & overtime; 
(c) job security and (e) 
voice  
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts) and ↓ collective rights 
(↓ freedom to organise and ↓CB 
coverage) after 2011; ↑ TAW law 2015 to 
= prior 2011 
↓ protection of (a) wages; (b) 
working time; (c) job security; 
(d) social benefits; (e) voice 
↑ Internal and 
↑external flexibility 
Slovakia 
↓ Individual rights (↑ 
flexible  working time) and ↓ 
collective rights (↓ limitation 
of union rights) 
↓ protection of (b) working 
time - (c ) voice  
↓ Individual rights (↑ scope and duration 
of N-St contracts) 2003-2009   ↑ 
Individual rights (↑protection of TAW, 
fixed-term and work agreements) 2012-
2015 
↓ (c ) job security; ↑ (d) social 
benefits; ↑ (c ) job security 
after 2012  
↑ Internal flexibility  
Slovenia 
↓ Individual rights  
(↓unemployment benefits, ↓ 
job security , ↑ flexible 
working time, ↓ overtime 
payments) 
↓ protection of (a) wages; 
(b) working time (c) job 
security and (d) social 
benefits  
↑ Individual rights ( ↓ scope and 
duration of N-St contracts, ↑ access to 
unemployment benefits and severance 
payments for fixed-term) 
↑ (c ) job security; ↑ (d) social 
benefits 
↑ Internal flexibility  
 Legend:  ↓= decreased;  ↑=increased
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In addition, the legal changes after 2008 facilitate the use of external flexibility by employers 
(Table 6). First, apart from lowering job security for employees on standard contracts and part-
time employees, the legal changes made it easier to use different forms of fixed-term contracts, 
by broadening the scope for using temporary contracts and increasing the maximum duration of 
such contracts in most countries (e.g. Croatia, Greece, Hungary and Romania). Nevertheless, post 
2008 legal changes provided more protection concerning job security and social benefits for non-
standard workers in Slovenia. Also, major legal changes facilitating the use of the non-standard 
contracts started from the beginning of the 2000s in many countries (e.g. Poland and Slovakia). 
Second, the undermining of collective rights, particularly making it more difficult to organise 
non-standard workers (e.g. agency workers) and procedural rules concerning weakening of the 
statutory extension mechanisms of collective bargaining at sectoral level as well as potential 
derogations from sectoral collective agreements, reduced the voice and collective bargaining 
coverage of non-standard workers, which in turn affected their wages. Finally, although in 
several countries there has been an increase of protection of non-standard workers to make the 
laws in line with the EU regulations (Table 6), particularly concerning agency workers (e.g. 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), it is rather difficult to implement those 
changes, in a context of weak state capacity of law enforcement. By and large, the recent legal 
changes have increased the scope and duration of most non-standard contracts in all countries, 
making it easier to use external flexibility to deal with market uncertainty after 2008, except in 
Slovenia.  
Moreover, employers got more control over the job quality dimensions for both standard and 
non-standard employees due to a decline in the joint regulation by the social partners of terms 
and conditions of work conditions in virtually all countries (Table 7). The largest decline of 
collective bargaining coverage has occurred in Romania and Greece, where the post-2008 legal 
changes have undermined the most the collective employment rights (Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 
2016; Trif, 2016). The weakening of collective rights also led to a considerable decline in 
collective bargaining in Slovakia and Hungary, while the large decline in collective bargaining in 
Slovenia was linked to the abolition of mandatory membership of employers to the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in 2006 (Table 7). Recent developments in collective bargaining resulted 
in lower cross country variation in collective bargaining coverage, due to a far higher decline in 
collective bargaining coverage in countries with higher collective bargaining coverage. More 
specifically, there has been a convergence across the 10 countries towards decentralised and 
uncoordinated collective bargaining which increases the prospect of precarious working 
conditions in all countries, but variation across countries still exist (Table 7).  The decline in 
collective bargaining coverage has the potential to affect all five job quality dimensions for 
employees with standard and non-standard contracts, while allowing increased variation across 
and within sectors in each country.  
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Table 7: Trends in collective bargaining coverage across the 10 countries 
 
Source: Bargaining coverage based on ICTWSS database (AdjCov) (Visser, 2016) 
 Note: * Data from 2012 instead of 2013 
Apart from providing more flexibility to employers to set the selected job quality dimensions, the 
national reports indicate that the decline in joint regulation combined with legal changes that 
increase the prerogatives of employers to use flexible working time arrangements have facilitated 
the increase in different forms of informal work. In a context of a weak capacity of enforcement 
of labour laws by the state across all 10 countries, findings suggest that different forms of hybrid 
formal and informal practices have emerged for both standard and non-standard employees, 
varying from paying employees on standard contracts the minimum wage and an additional ‘cash 
in hand’ to bogus self-employment or no work contract at all. On the one hand, the legal changes 
that allow employers to use shorter or longer working week, make it more difficult for labour 
inspectors to verify whether or not the labour laws are enforced. On the other hand, the decline in 
collective bargaining and unions’ influence has reduced their capacity to safeguard the 
implementation of the labour laws at company level.  
 
2.2.2 The impact of post-2008 regulatory changes on the precarization of work 
Despite the legal changes making it far easier to use non-standard work contracts, there has not 
been a considerable rise in the share of non-standard contracts across the 10 countries after 2008. 
First, the percentage of self-employed, which represent the highest share of non-standard 
contracts in Greece and most new EU Members States (unlike in most old EU Members States), 
has remained relatively stable since 2008; there was a 0.4% increase from 2008 to 2015 as a 
share of total labour force on average across the 10 countries (Table 8). The ratio of self-
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employed has increased mostly in Latvia and Slovenia, where there has been an increase in 
protection of other forms of non-standard contracts (e.g. agency workers), while their share 
declined the most in Croatia, where other forms of temporary contracts have increased the most 
(Table 9). Second, the share of other forms of temporary contracts have increased by 2.2% on 
average in the 10 countries between 2008 and 2015 (Eurostat, 2016). There is great variation in 
the use of temporary contracts of employment varying from 28% in Poland to 1.4% in Romania 
(Table 9). Also, the increase in the use of temporary contracts after 2008 varied from 8% in 
Croatia and 6% in Slovakia to under one percent in Romania, Greece and Slovenia (see Table 9). 
Interestingly, the latter group of countries had the highest decline in collective bargaining 
coverage since 2008, which could have contributed to a rise in internal flexibility for standard 
contracts. Overall, there has been an increase in the use of temporary contracts after 2008, which 
inherently have lower job security than open ended contracts, but it was lower than expected 
considering the major legal changes supporting external flexibility.  
 
Table 8: Trends in  self-employment across countries (2008-2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) [lfsa_eftpt] 
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Table 9: Fixed-term contracts across countries (2008-2015)   
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) [lfsa_eftpt] 
In addition, there has been rather limited increase in part-time contracts across the 10 countries 
investigated. The share of part-time contracts increased by 1.4% on average in the 10 countries 
between 2008 and 2015 (Table 10). Unlike in most of the old Member States, where part-time 
contracts are the most common non-standard form of employment (representing 17% of total 
contracts of employment in 2015), the share of part-time contracts is more than three times lower 
on average in the new EU Member States (table 10). Furthermore, the findings suggest that part-
time contracts are often used in disguise for full-time contracts in order to pay lower taxes in 
some countries (e.g. Croatia, Greece, Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania). This might explain the 
peculiar fact that in Romania, men are as likely as women to have part-time jobs. Findings across 
the 10 countries suggest that employees cannot afford to work part-time due to the low level of 
wages. The main precarious dimension of part-time work is low wages, while the increase in 
part-time jobs is primarily explained by declaring full-time jobs as part-time to pay lower taxes. 
Nevertheless employers have also reduced the working hours for standard contracts from eight 
hour per day to part-time contracts arguing that employees are more efficient in the first 5-6 
hours of work, particularly when they have to do repetitive jobs and/or have to lift heavy loads 
(e.g. in the retail sector) in some countries (e.g. Slovenia and Lithuania). Hence, part-time work is 
sometimes used as a form of internal flexibility for standard contracts.  
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Table 10: Part-time contracts across countries (2008-2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016) [lfsa_eftpt] 
Summing up, unlike in most old EU member states, the self-employed represent the largest 
category of non-standard workers, followed by temporary employees and part-time contracts in 
the 10 countries investigated, including Greece. Overall, the Eurostat data (2016) shows a slight 
increase in external flexibility, particularly in relation to the use of temporary contracts. These 
developments suggest an increase of precarization along job security dimension, while it is 
unclear whether other job quality dimensions have been affected. Moreover, standard forms of 
employment dominate in all 10 countries investigated; their average share of full-time contracts 
out of total employment is 77.4%, which is 10% higher than the average in the EU 28 (Eurostat, 
2016). Consequently, it is important to examine to what extent employers have used their new 
legal prerogatives to worsen the terms and conditions of employment for employees (or workers) 
on both standard and non-standard contracts in the 10 countries. The next section discusses the 
interplay between the use of external and internal flexibility across countries in the five sectors 
investigated based on the qualitative data.  
 
2.3 Trends in work precariousness across countries in the selected sectors 
Empirical findings suggest that there has been a rise in work precariousness by increased use of 
internal and external flexibility in all countries after 2008, but there is variation across sectors and 
countries. In all countries, the construction and retail sectors have the highest incidence of 
precarious work, while the healthcare and metal sectors the lowest level of precarization. The 
nature of the TAW sector as a supplier of labour force for user companies in different sectors 
makes it contingent on the working conditions in the user companies, which leads to great 
variation in the quality of their working conditions, except the inherited job insecurity. While 
agency workers are generally employed on temporary contracts to ensure external flexibility for 
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other sectors, standard contracts are dominant in all the other sectors across the 10 countries 
investigated.   
There are many similarities in the development of precarious work in the construction sector 
across the 10 countries. The construction sector was the worst hit by the 2008 recession, which 
led to increased use of both internal and external flexibility by employers across countries. Apart 
from its inherited precariousness due to seasonal work and heavy physical work, the construction 
sector is characterized by long subcontracting chains aiming to reduce labour costs to improve 
the prospect of large companies to get the big construction projects, as often the procurement 
procedures favours the lowest bid (e.g. Latvia and Romania). In virtually all countries it was 
reported that there was an increase in external flexibility by a rise in the use of non-standard 
forms, including informal work (without a contract) and (bogus) self-employment, particularly at 
the bottom of the sub-contracting chains. The main job quality dimensions affected are the lack 
of job security, irregular working time, commonly no social benefits, no voice and uncertainty 
concerning the income. Also, the lower tiers in the sub-contracting chains are the most likely to 
be paid late or not paid at all when companies in upper tiers get bankrupt (e.g. Croatia, Greece 
and Romania). Nevertheless, it was reported that in some countries, workers without a contract 
received higher wages than those with a contract, as employers and workers do not pay relevant 
taxes. Overall, findings suggest a major increase in external flexibility by the proliferation of 
informal work, self-employed and other forms of contracts based on the duration of project.  
In addition, there has been an increase in internal flexibility for employees on standard contracts 
in all 10 countries. First, the recession combined with the reduction of collective bargaining 
coverage has led to lowering wages across all countries, particularly for low skilled employees. 
In Greece, employees on standard contracts had wage cuts up to 70%, late payments and 
compulsory unpaid leave. There were also wage reductions, at least for the declared wages, in the 
other countries; most employees were paid the minimum wage, while some of them got 
additional cash in hand to avoid paying the relevant taxes in some countries (Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania). Second, employees on standard contracts frequently work 
irregular working hours, while in some countries employers register full-time workers as part-
time workers to reduce the amount of taxes paid (e.g. Croatia, Latvia and Romania). Third, the 
hybrid legal and illegal forms of payment reduce the contribution to social benefits, including 
pensions for employees on standard contracts. Despite labour shortages due to emigration to the 
old EU Member States, there has been a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of the quality of working 
conditions by an increase use of both internal and external flexibility in the construction sector, 
for most workers. Nevertheless, the worst affected workers were those doing low skilled jobs in 
small companies that were at the bottom of the sub-contracting chains.  
Apart from construction, the retail sector is one of the most precarious in all 10 countries. Unlike 
developments in the construction sector, the increased precariousness in the retail is primarily due 
to increased internal flexibility, but there is variation across countries. Employers in the retail 
sector have used their new prerogatives to increase internal flexibility by a combination of wage 
cuts, increased in workload and irregular working time for employees on standard contracts. 
Labour costs were reduced in different ways; apart from wage cuts for all workers, in some 
countries, all new employees get the minimum wage (e.g. Greece and Romania) or less than 
minimum wage (e.g. Poland); also, in some countries employers do not pay the overtime work 
(e.g. Croatia, Greece and Lithuania). Moreover, in several countries it was reported a 
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considerable intensification of work (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania and Romania), which in turn led to 
an increased in the number of accidents at work (e.g. Lithuania). Moreover, retail employers in 
Slovenia have reduced the working hours to increase labour productivity, as productivity tends to 
fall after five hours of work when doing repetitive tasks. Moreover, irregular working time has 
been used to increase flexibility on standard contracts (e.g. the daily working schedule could vary 
greatly contingent on the needs of the firms), including compulsory work during week-ends and 
other public holidays. Finally, there is limited union representation of the retail workers in most 
countries, primarily due to extremely high fluctuation of labour. Thus, low wages, irregular 
working time and the lack of voice are the main precarious dimensions for employees on standard 
contracts in the retail sector.  
In addition, there has been a slight increase in external flexibility by using more temporary and 
part-time contracts in most countries. At one extreme are developments in Poland, where over a 
third of the total labour force have temporary contracts and circa are 20% self-employed 
(Eurostat, 2016); nevertheless, there have been rather marginal changes after 2008; the share of 
temporary contracts has increased by 2.7% between 2008 and 2014, while the share of self-
employed has declined by 1.2% after 2008 in Poland (Eurostat, 2016). Moreover, in Greece there 
was a considerable growth of non-standard contracts after 2008, particularly the share of part-
time contracts doubled between 2008 and 2015 (from under 5% in 2008 to over 10% in 2015). At 
the other extreme are developments in Romania, with over 97% of the total labour force working 
full-time and a decline in the share of non-standard contracts post 2008; the share of self-
employed has been reduced from 15% to 10% between 2008 to 2014, while the share of part-time 
contracts declined from 2.5% to 1.6% over the same period (Eurostat, 2016). In most of the other 
countries, the share of part-time contract has increased, but sometimes part-time contracts were 
used to disguise the full-time contracts to reduce the payment of taxes (e.g. Croatia, Greece and 
Latvia). Despite an increase in the use of non-standard contracts in many countries, the increase 
in work precariousness post 2008 in the retail sector is primarily due to low wages, irregular 
working time and increased workloads for all workers independent of the type of contact, and not 
necessary along job security.  
Somewhat surprisingly considering the inherited job insecurity, by and large, workers in the 
TAW sector appeared to have less precarious working conditions that those working in the retail 
and construction sectors, but there is great variation in the job quality dimensions within the 
sector and across countries. This sector is rather unique due to several inter-related reasons: (a) it 
was developed relatively recently in CEE; the share of agency workers has increased 
considerably since 2008 in most countries, while it seems to be still relatively small; nevertheless, 
the statistical data is not reliable, as TAW is generally not considered a distinct sector; (b) there is 
great variation in the terms and conditions of employment even for a specific worker, contingent 
on working conditions in different user companies; (c) the EU regulations have led to an 
improvement of the legal protection of agency workers after 2008 in most CEE, but the legal 
provisions are frequently abused (e.g. Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania); 
and (d) temporary agencies in some countries post workers abroad (e.g. Latvia, Slovakia and 
Romania), which adds an international dimension to it.  
As TAW sector generally supplies agency workers for companies operating in other sectors (and 
other countries), it primarily facilitates a rise in external flexibility to deal with fluctuations in the 
market demands.  
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 First, as temporary contracts represent the dominant employment form, job insecurity is a 
key precarious dimension for agency workers. Nevertheless, as both workers and 
employers prefer to have a degree of certainty, often agencies find ‘innovative’ (semi-
legal) ways to increase the legal maximum duration of temporary contracts by shifting 
workers from one agency to another, while the worker continues to work with the same 
company (e.g. Romania) or the legal provisions concerning the maximum duration of the 
contract are not applied (e.g. Greece, Poland). 
 Second, agency workers’ wages are often (but not always) lower than those of similar 
employees in the user companies, despite recent legal changes in many countries that 
require equal treatment of the two categories of workers (e.g. in Czechia it was reported 
that equal treatment rules are not enforced by up to 50% of user companies, while in 
several other countries abuses were reported). In addition, in some countries agency 
workers are paid the minimum wage, while additional payments are made in other forms, 
such as subsistence allowance, which are exempt from tax and social contributions (e.g. 
Slovakia and Romania – for posted workers). The substitution of wage to other forms of 
payment affect workers’ pensions and other entitlements to social benefits. Nevertheless, 
the wages of the agency workers also depend on their skills and the type of jobs that they 
are employed to do. Although generally agencies provide labour force to work in low 
skilled jobs in the metal, retail, hospitality and cleaning sectors, the higher the skills 
required for the job the more likely is that they would be paid above the wages for the 
user companies employees (e.g. in Romania is was reported that circa 10% of the agency 
workers are paid more than the user companies workers doing similar jobs; also, a 
minority of agency workers may occupy very senior managerial positions either by 
replacing senior managers on annual leave or when MNCs set up new subsidiaries). 
Finally, the average wages for agency workers in Lithuania is significantly higher than the 
national average wages. Hence, there is great variation across countries and within the 
TAW sector regarding the quality of working conditions.  
 Third, the vast majority of agency workers are not unionised and do not have a voice, 
which often affects all the other job quality dimensions; also, the lack of unionisation 
makes it easier for some agencies to use illegal work practices (labour laws are less likely 
to be implemented in non-unionised companies) which, apart from affecting workers, it 
leads to unfair competition amongst agencies.  
In addition, agency workers are sometimes utilized to reduce labour costs in the user companies 
by subcontracting specific business operations (e.g. form IT and payroll services to cleaning and 
transportation of goods). Consequently, the use (or the threat of using) agency workers has led to 
a rise in internal flexibility in relation to job insecurity, lower wages and irregular working time 
for employees on standard contracts in the user companies (e.g. IT and automotive industries in 
Hungary and Romania).  
Although agency workers contributed to an increase in external (and sometimes internal) 
flexibility for user companies, findings suggested that the quality of their working conditions is 
not as precarious as it could be expected. Unlike workers in the construction and retail sectors, 
agency workers were more likely to find work after 2008. Also, it was reported that agency 
workers in low skilled jobs may get more training as well as more diverse tasks than low-skilled 
(standard) employees, by working in different companies. Last but not least, there has been in 
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increase in the legal protection of agency workers after 2008 in most countries, seeking generally 
equal treatment of agency workers with standard workers doing similar jobs in the user 
companies (except job security). Nevertheless, those legal regulations are often abused. Also, 
agency workers have high job and income security, which makes their life more difficult, 
particularly in the long term (e.g. apart from lower contributions to social security, it makes it 
virtually impossible to get a mortgage to buy a house).  
Although the quality of working conditions in the metal sector is generally less precarious than 
those in the TAW, retail and construction sectors, there has been in increase in both internal and 
external flexibility in most countries after 2008. Unlike the other sectors investigated, the metal 
sector is closely integrated into the global market, particularly the automotive and steel industries. 
As a result, the global recession has led generally to a reduction of demands in the first years of 
the recession, which in turn led to a considerable reduction of the labour force in most countries. 
In this context, employers used both internal flexibility and external flexibility. Different from 
other sectors, the increase in internal flexibility has been primarily linked to different forms of 
irregular working time. Annualised working hours were introduced first in the automotive 
industry in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia and then in other sectors. Also, a shorter-working 
week was adopted after 2008 in Croatia, Greece, Lithuania and Romania; in Hungary, there was 
no extra payment for overtime or week-end work. While many companies got bankrupt during 
the recession, wages were generally not reduced for employees on standard contracts working in 
large companies that remained profitable after 2008. However, there have been delays in 
payments of wages in Croatia and Greece, and in some countries, suppliers to large companies 
(generally smaller companies) provide lower wages (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania and Romania). Also, 
health and safety issues were reported in Latvia and Lithuania. Nevertheless, union density in the 
metal sector is generally higher than in the other private sectors investigated. Thus, there has been 
an increase in internal flexibility across countries, primarily through irregular working time.   
In addition, external flexibility in the metal sector has increased primarily by a rise in the use of 
agency workers and sub-contracting or outsourcing. The national reports indicate that the metal 
sector is amongst the highest users of agency workers in most countries (e.g. 76% of agency 
workers were employed in the metal sector in 2014 in Czechia, an increase from 63% in 2009). In 
Croatia for instance, the share of different forms of temporary contracts in the metal sector was 
almost doubled reaching 20% in 2014. Apart from job insecurity, outsourced and agency workers 
have lower wages (e.g. up to 50% in Poland; up to 30% in Romania); also, agency workers have 
lower (if any) contributions to social security and generally are not unionised. Somewhat 
surprisingly, temporary contracts have also become the norm for newly hired workers between 
2009 and 2013 in Slovenia, as employers could pay them less than employees on standard 
contracts; nevertheless, the legal changes of 2013, which require equal treatment of temporary 
employees with those on standard contracts, have reduced the use of fixed term contracts after 
2013 in Slovenia. By and large, the increased external flexibility has also led to an increased the 
internal flexibility, but the existence of relatively stronger unions has limited the reduction of 
wages in the metal sector for employees on standard contracts.  
Unlike in the metal sector, the austerity measures applied in the public healthcare sector led 
primarily to increased internal flexibility by reducing wages and increasing the workload for 
employees on standard contracts. There have been successive waves of major restructuring of 
public healthcare services since the 1990s in all 10 countries, seeking to improve the use of the 
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scare financial resources in a context relatively public spending. Apart from a fragmentation of 
the administration of public hospitals, restructuring also led to the privatization or outsourcing of 
non-core services in some countries (e.g. Greece, Hungary and Poland) as well as an increase in 
privatization of certain hospitals and core services (e.g. Greece, Poland and Romania). In the 
context of the crisis, the healthcare public spending decreased, particularly in countries that 
introduced austerity measures (e.g. it decreased from 6.3% in 2008 to 3.9% in 2015 in Greece), 
which led to wage cuts for employees on standard contracts (e.g. wage cuts were up to 40% in 
Romania). In some countries, nurses and other medical specialists are paid minimum wage or 
close to minimum wage (e.g. in Romania, it was reported that circa 60% of healthcare employees 
on standard contracts are paid minimum wages; in Lithuania nurses are paid close to minimum 
wage). Moreover, in most countries nurses are unhappy to the low wage levels (e.g. Czechia, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Romania), particularly in a context of increased workload after 2008.  
Apart from wages, the working time and the remuneration of irregular working hours for 
employees on standard contracts have become more precarious after 2008 across the 10 
countries.  The labour shortages (often associated with emigration of doctors and nurses into the 
old Member States) and virtually an employment freeze after 2008 in some countries (e.g. 
Greece, Romania and Slovenia) have led to increased workload and resulted in longer working 
hours. In Hungary, it was reported that it is impossible for many nurses to take a lunch break due 
to staff shortages, while in Romania nurses often have to work unpaid overtime in hospitals to 
ensure patient safety. Also unpaid overtime is an issue of contention in Croatia. Apart from 
working long hours, sometimes above the maximum legal regulations (e.g. Greece and Hungary), 
24/7 service provided by hospitals, including shift work, night work, week-ends and public 
holidays are sometimes overlooked precarious features of the working conditions in the 
healthcare sector. It was reported that circa 60% of the labour force in Slovenia has non-standard 
or flexible working time in the healthcare sector, which affects the work-life balance of 
employees.   
In addition to internal flexibility, in some countries there has been an increase of external 
flexibility. First, the shortage of medical staff combined with low wages has led to the emergence 
of hybrid forms of employment. In several countries, doctors and nurses on standard contracts in 
the public sector have a second job as self-employed or other forms of non-standard contracts in 
the private sector; it is estimated that 2/3 of nurses have a second job in Poland, while second 
jobs for medical staff were also reported in Czechia, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia; furthermore, 
it was revealed that doctors may have three jobs in Latvia. Medical staff with multiple jobs work 
very long hours, which may affecting the quality of the services provided. Second, there has been 
an increase in subcontracting and outsourcing in some countries, particularly for non-core 
services (e.g. Greece, Hungary and Poland). The subcontracting firms often pay their workers 
lower wages than those of workers in the user companies (e.g. wages up to 70% lower wages for 
workers employed by subcontracting firms in Greece) and have lower job security. Finally, other 
non-standard forms of contracts have increased, such as self-employed in Poland (circa 75% of 
doctors are self-employed), and fixed-term contracts in Slovakia (the new contracts are generally 
fixed-term) and Slovenia (approximately 15% of the total labour force has non-standard 
contracts, mostly temporary contracts). Nevertheless, in Romania and Croatia, the share of 
temporary contracts has declined after 2008; there was a decline from 10% of the total labour 
force in 2008 to 6% in 2014 in Croatia, but this reduction was primarily due to the fact that many 
employees on fixed-term contracts lost their jobs after 2008. Despite a degree of increase in 
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external flexibility in the healthcare sector, the precarization of work after 2008 was primarily 
due to increased internal flexibility in the form of lower wages and work intensification, 
including longer (often unpaid) working hours for employees on standard contracts. There has 
been far more limited precarization along job security in the healthcare sector compared to the 
other sectors investigated, due to more severe labour shortages in many countries as well as the 
fact that the demand for medical services did not decline during the recession.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the overall findings suggest that insiders versus outsiders dualization 
contingent on job security is not the main reason for increased precariousness of work in the 10 
countries investigated. Instead, the erosion of working conditions for workers on standard 
contracts since 2008, particularly in relation to wages and working time, is the main cause of the 
rise of work precariousness in all 10 countries investigated. Nevertheless, the use of internal 
flexibility (and its consequences for job dimensions) varied across sectors; the increased use of 
internal flexibility has the dominant contribution to a rise in precariousness in the retail and 
healthcare sectors, while a combination of increased internal and external flexibility has increased 
work precariousness in the construction and metal sectors. The crisis led to an increase in the 
share of agency workers in the 10 countries, which in turn, has increased external flexibility for 
other sectors (e.g. metal, retail, IT etc) as well as internal flexibility in some user companies. 
Unlike developments in the other sectors, there has been an increase in the legal protection of 
agency workers in recent years requiring equal treatment of agency workers with user company 
workers, but there have been reports of issues with law enforcement in several countries (e.g. 
Czechia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). Overall, the combination of legal deregulation 
and decline of joint regulation has led to an increase in the informal and grey work practices since 
2008, which is a major concern for both (most) employers and trade unions.  
 
2.4 Concluding remarks: varieties of dualization and precarization 
The 2008 international economic crisis combined with the transition to liberal market economies 
and the EU accession process of the nine CEE countries, have contributed to reshaping the labour 
legislation, which in turn affected the level of labour market dualization and work precarization. 
Considering the changes in the gap between the quality of working conditions for employees on 
standard and non-standard contracts after 2008, the 10 countries investigated can be grouped into 
three categories, as follows:  
(1) Reduction of dualization in Hungary, Greece, Romania and Slovenia. 
There has been a reduction of labour market dualization in Hungary, Greece, Romania and 
Slovenia after 2008 due to the erosion of working conditions for employees on standard 
contracts, by weakening of employment protection legislation (Table 6) and a massive reduction 
of joint regulation by social partners (Table 7). Although the legislation makes it also easier to 
use non-standard contracts (except in Slovenia after 2013), particularly by increasing the scope 
and duration of temporary contracts, by and large, employers have been more likely to use 
internal flexibility to deal with fluctuations in demand, particularly in a context of labour 
shortages. Furthermore, the dualization may also be lower due to the fact that workers with non-
standard forms of contracts were most likely to lose their jobs during the crisis. Although there is 
a degree of variation across countries and sectors in the share of level of non-standard forms 
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(including illegal work) and the quality of working conditions in the four countries, the increased 
use of internal flexibility played a key role in the precarization of work in those countries. 
Despite having different national institutional arrangements across the four countries (Bohle and 
Greskovitz, 2012), by and large, the 2008 crisis was used as an opportunity to undermine 
individual and collective employment rights. The deregulation of standard contracts reduced 
labour dualisation at the detriment of the insiders, while it, generally, led to increased 
precariousness for workers on both standard and non-standard contracts. Nevertheless, there was 
an increase in the legal protection of non-standard workers after 2013 in Slovenia, which also 
contributed to the reduction in dualization. Precarious work developments in Greece were rather 
similar to those in CEE, which may suggest that the 2008 crisis and the subsequent austerity 
measures recommended by Troika in three out of the four countries (except Slovenia), had a 
crucial impact on labour market developments. Nevertheless, Greece shares with CEE a high 
degree of legal intervention in the regulation of the labour market, including having a Labour 
Code, which makes it easier for governments (sometimes obliged by supra-national institutions) 
to deregulate the labour market in a context of a crisis. Furthermore, Greece has the highest share 
of self-employed in the EU, which is far more common in the CEE. Thus, developments in 
precarious work in Greece appears to be more similar to those CEE than those in the old EU 
Members States.   
2) No change in Latvia and Lithuania 
Second, there have been very limited changes in the level of labour market dualisation in Latvia 
and Lithuania after 2008, primarily due to strengthening protection for non-standard workers, 
while relaxing job security for standard employees. This approach was neutral in terms of 
dualisation. Nevertheless, the standard contract is characterised by low wages, long working 
hours, low social security and de facto very limited voice. Unlike in the first category of 
countries, there was no decline in joint regulation, as there has been very low union density and 
collective bargaining coverage since the 1990s in the Baltic States.  Similar to developments 
prior 2008, working conditions are contingent on employers’ ‘good will’ and ‘sense of ethics’. 
Interestingly, the increase in the legal protection of non-standard workers has led to increased use 
of informal practices, in a context of very weak consolidation and influence of the social partners. 
National legal interventions, if anything, have increased informal employment during the crisis. 
3) Increased dualization in Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland 
Third, there has been an increase in labour market dualization in Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia and 
Poland, primarily due to a rise in the share of non-standard contracts. By and large, the post 2008 
legislation makes it easier to employ workers on non-standard contracts in these countries, while 
there have been limited changes concerning joint regulation and legal provisions for employees 
on standard contracts. While most new contracts are non-standard in those countries, there has 
been an increase in flexible working time arrangements and workload for core employees, similar 
to developments in the other two categories of countries.  
Summing up, although there has been a rise in non-standard forms of employment in some 
countries investigated, the findings across the 10 countries investigated indicate that the main 
reason for the rise in work precariousness is the deterioration of working conditions for 
employees on standard employment contracts, in a context of an erosion of industrial relations 
institutions. Despite a rise in precariousness, there was not necessary a growth of dualization 
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between insiders and outsiders across the 10 countries. The varieties of dualization are primarily 
contingent on legal  changes adopted by governments (sometimes linked directly to international 
policies e.g. austerity measures agreed with the Troika, EU accession process, EU Directives) and 
the joint regulations by the social partners, and not necessary determined by the type of 
institutional arrangements in each country (Bohle and Greskovitz, 2012). 
 
Chapter 3: Trade unions and precarious work 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The second key objective of this project is to examine the role and influence of trade unions in 
addressing precarious work in CEE and Greece. In a context of increasing labour market 
deregulation (chapter 2) combined with a decline in union density after 2008 (Visser, 2016), trade 
unions are faced with the dilemma on whether to use their limited resources to defend the rights 
of the core workers on standard contracts, who are generally the main category of union members 
(insiders) and/or those of workers on non-standard contracts, who are rarely union members 
(outsiders), but often have the most precarious working conditions (Heery, 2009). Furthermore, 
findings show that there has been an increase in work precariousness after 2008 for many 
workers on both standard and non-standard contracts in the 10 countries investigated (chapter 2). 
These developments suggest that, by and large, unions have not been very effective in protecting 
workers’ rights, but there has been variation across countries and sectors. This chapter examines 
under which conditions trade unions were able to address precarious work? 
In order to identify the main factors affecting the effectiveness on trade unions in fighting against 
precarious work after 2008, it is important to review the key aspects that shaped trade unions’ 
role and influence in CEE before the crisis. Trade unions are the only institution that survived the 
communist regime, which has affected their development after 1989 in several ways (Crowley, 
2004). First, unions in CEE retained relatively strong legal protection after 1989, including the 
legal right to bargain collectively and to be involved in national and sectoral tri-partite or bi-
partite bodies (Funk and Lesch, 2004). Second, the reformed national unions’ confederations 
have generally kept some of communist unions’ assets, including properties and hotels, which 
have become a source of income after 1989. In these circumstances, the membership support and 
membership fees were not crucial elements for the survival of many national union 
confederations (Trif, 2014).  
The inherited communist legacies had mixed effects on trade unions’ effectiveness in defending 
workers’ rights (Crowley, 2004; Funk and Lesch, 2004). On the one hand, the inherited legacies 
have become important enablers that ensured unions’ continued existence and guaranteed a role 
and influence in regulation working conditions. In all CEE, unions were involved in tripartite 
social pacts and in setting the minimum wage regulations in the early 2000s (Funk and Lesch, 
2004: 266). Nevertheless, there was a degree of variation in the role and influence of unions 
across countries (e.g. the highest union density and collective bargaining coverage was in 
Slovenia, while the lowest were in Latvia and Lithuania) (Funk and Lesch, 2004). On the other 
hand, the reliance on external legitimacy has reduced the need for improving internal legitimacy 
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for unions, including the necessity to organise and mobilize workers to prove their raison d'être 
(Crowley, 2004). The limited reliance of unions on members support for their main roles 
combined with the fact that the company-level union has continued to be the basic unit of the 
labour movement in the CEE have contributed to the vertical fragmentation of unions (Trif, 
2014). Also, there has been a horizontal fragmentation of the union movement (the initial 
division was between reformed and new unions), with multiple unions operating at the same level 
and/or bargaining unit (Funk and Lesch, 2004:265). Furthermore, the association of the unions 
with the communist regime and the perpetuation of the involvement into politics of union 
leaders’, has reduced their internal legitimacy (Trif, 2014). Although the inherited communist 
legacies had several negative effects on trade unions in CEE (Crowley, 2004), their statutory 
rights ensured a degree of external legitimacy.  
The statutory support for unions has been diminished after 2008 in half of the countries 
investigated. Apart from undermining individual employment rights, post-2008 legal changes 
have also reduced collective rights in Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia (see 
Table 6). Unsurprisingly, the largest decline in union density and collective bargaining coverage 
has occurred in Romania, where the most drastic limitations concerning the freedom to organise 
in trade union, to bargain collectively and to strike were introduced after 2008 (Trif, 2016). 
Nevertheless, union density and collective bargaining coverage have declined in all 10 countries 
after 2008 (Table 11, Table 7). Thus, there have been rather unfavourable circumstances for trade 
unions to fight against precarious work after 2008.  
Table 11: Trends in trade union density (2008 -2012) 
 
Source: Union density based on ICTWSS database (UD) (Visser, 2016) 
Note:  Poland* data 2007; Greece** data 2013 
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Based on the empirical findings, this chapter provides insights into the experiences of unions 
regarding organizing and representing precarious workers, seeking to improve the quality of their 
working conditions in the selected sectors across the 10 countries. As indicated in the analytical 
framework presented in Chapter 1, the findings seek to answer the following interrelated 
questions: (a) Why unions takes specific actions towards precarious work? (b) What are their 
approaches toward precarious workers? (c) How unions implement those actions (instruments 
used)? (d) What are the implications of unions’ actions for precarious work? In order to identify 
the main factors affecting the effectiveness on trade unions in fighting against precarious work, 
the analysis of the findings examines enablers and inhibitors of precarious work after 2008.  
 
3.2 The rationales for trade unions actions vis-à-vis precarious work across countries 
As indicated in the analytical framework, there are four sets of rationales that may be taken into 
account by trade unions when dealing with precarious work. In addition to the economic, 
institutional, and social rationales for unions’ actions identified by Freeman and Medoff (1984), 
the organisational capacity rationale was considered for this study (see chapter 1). These 
rationales are not mutually exclusive; unions may consider a single rationale or any combination 
of them for their actions to address precarious work.  
The empirical findings from the 10 EU Member Studies surveyed in the project suggest that trade 
unions have accepted an increased in the use of internal and external flexibility by employers for 
economic considerations. In all countries, trade unions agreed to a degree of flexibility contingent 
of employers’ needs, but the level of acceptance of internal and external flexibility varied across 
countries. At one extreme, the Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia (the sole national union 
confederation) has supported the economic need for different non-standard forms of employment, 
including part-time, fixed-term contracts and self-employment. Furthermore, union 
representatives revealed that addressing precarious work was not a priority for them, as most 
workers on non-standard contracts are not union members; this union focused its limited 
resources to protect their members’ rights.  
At the other extreme, trade unions in Slovenia seek to transform precarious work arrangements 
into standard employment contracts; this goal was reflected by the new labour law adopted in 
2013, prepared with the involvement of representatives of both unions and employers; this law 
restricts external flexibility, while it increases internal flexibility by making it easier to dismiss 
regular employees. The level of unions’ support for efficiency rationale in the other countries 
were between the two extremes. Similar to developments in Slovenia, unions generally accepted 
(often under pressure from employers and/or governments) various trade-offs between internal 
and external flexibility across the other countries. In some countries, trade unions accepted non-
standard forms of employment to reduce high unemployment (e.g. Croatia, Greece and Slovakia). 
Apart from very limited unionisation and articulation of the interests of precarious workers, it 
appears trade unions in CEE are reluctant to oppose the reduction of labour costs by using 
internal and external flexibility, particularly in the context of the crisis, as they fear that of being 
labelled ‘communist’ unions. 
The second rationale identified by Freeman and Medoff (1984), namely the institutional 
rationale, has been the dominant consideration for union actions in most countries. The 
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institutional consideration refers to whether unions’ actions were motivated by seeking to ensure 
equality of working conditions for ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Palier and Thelen, 2010). First, 
unions in all 10 countries investigated have attempted to facilitate equality in society through 
their involvement in recent amendments of the labour laws, particularly in relation to equalizing 
the working conditions for agency workers with those of regular employees. Second, unions in 
most countries seek to bargain collectively for both insiders and outsiders working in a specific 
company, aiming to ensure equal working conditions for workers on standard and non-standard 
contracts. Finally, in a context of weak capacity of law enforcement in all 10 countries 
investigates, the most common joint initiatives by unions and employers were to reduce informal 
practices, as informal work undermines working conditions for standard employees and create 
unfair competition for employers. 
Nevertheless, the extent of unions’ support for workers on non-standard contracts varied across 
countries. At one extreme, unions in Greece do not accept members on work contracts that do not 
require employers and employees to pay social benefits (e.g. self-employed) for moral 
considerations. At the other extreme, unions in the healthcare sector in Romania have initiated a 
legal change in 2015 to promote a special type of self-employment for medical staff. The union 
sought to support their members on a standard employment contract to supplement their rather 
low salaries with an additional income by getting a second job. In contrast with developments in 
Greece, unions in the nine CEE investigated generally accept members on any types of work 
contracts, although very few workers on non-standard contracts are unionized. By and large, 
unions in CEE support equal treatment of insiders and outsiders to avoid the undermining of 
working conditions for standard workers. Although unions’ regulatory actions aiming to achieve 
equal treatment of standard and non-standard workers may have moral considerations, unions’ 
actions are often based on a pragmatic rationale seeking to defend their members’ rights and 
improve their organisational capacity.  
The third rationale identified by Freeman and Medoff (1984), namely the social legitimacy 
rationale, has been a rather implicit consideration for unions’ actions in most countries. In a 
context of a decline of union density and collective bargaining coverage after 2008 in all 10 
countries (see Table 11, Table 7) combined with undermining of basic union rights in some 
countries (Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia), a fundamental purpose of virtually 
all unions’ actions was to improve their legitimacy. At one extreme were developments in 
Romania, where union’ confederations and most federations lost their main raison d’être 
following the 2011 legal changes, namely to negotiate collective agreements.  Apart from a 
massive reduction in the statutory support for unions’ activities which reduced their external 
legitimacy, there has been a campaign of intimidation of union leaders, which reduced their 
internal legitimacy (Trif, 2016).  In this dire context, some unions, such as BNS, tried to change 
the focus of their activities from collective bargaining to providing individual services to 
members and non-members, including for vulnerable groups of precarious workers. At the other 
extreme, there were developments in Slovenia, where unions had limited issues with social 
legitimacy; nevertheless, the decentralisation of collective bargaining and the increase in the 
share of non-standard contracts after 2008, made it more relevant for unions to have a visible 
contribution to the reduction of precarious work, especially as non-standard work arrangements 
may undermine working conditions for regular employees.  
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Furthermore, in the hostile circumstances created by the combination of a severe crisis and 
undermining collective rights, some unions particularly in Romania and Greece took actions, 
such as organising and mobilizing precarious workers, to ensure their own survival. By and large, 
trade unions in the 10 countries investigates had pragmatic rationales for their actions seeking to 
maintain or increase their organizational capacity by ensuring their survival and legitimacy, as 
otherwise they would be unable to fight against precarious work. Specific developments and 
examples of best practices across countries will be discussed in the next section examining the 
approaches and instruments used by unions to address precarious work across sectors.  
 
3.3 Trade unions’ actions vis-à-vis precarious work across sectors 
As discussed in chapter 1, trade unions may seek to retain status quo, reduce or eliminate 
precarious work by adopting the following three approaches towards workers with precarious 
conditions: (a) inclusion, aiming to reduce or eliminate precarious work by getting the same 
rights for workers on standard and non-standard employment contracts (Heery, 2009); (b) 
separation, generally aiming to reduce the gap between working conditions for standard and non-
standard workers by developing special provisions for non-standard workers (Heery, 2009); and 
(c) exclusion, referring to the fact that unions seek to eliminate precarious work by refusing to 
accept members from specific categories of non-standard workers (e.g. self-employed) or to 
improve their working conditions (Heery, 2009). The actions adopted by unions to implement the 
selected approaches may vary from soft (e.g. information campaigns and consultation) to hard 
(e.g. legal changes, collective bargaining and industrial action) instruments (see chapter 1). While 
unions’ approaches imply an element of strategic freedom, their actions may be constrained by 
both external factors (e.g. employers, the legal framework and the labour market) and internal 
factors (e.g. their organisational capacity to implement the selected actions). Driven generally by 
a combination of equality and efficiency rationales, trade unions approaches and instruments to 
deal with precarious work varied across sectors being contingent on sectoral specific internal and 
external factors.   
3.3.1 Construction sector  
In the construction sector, elimination of (legal) precarious work forms was very rarely on trade 
unions agenda (except in Poland), as unions accepted the efficiency rationale for using non-
standard forms of contracts in all 10 countries investigated. The actions of unions were primarily 
aimed at the reduction of precarious work, based on the equality rationale in most countries 
(except Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary). In five countries with tradition of sectoral social 
dialogue and a degree of coordination of collective bargaining (Croatia, Greece, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia), trade unions had an inclusive approach seeking to increase the equality in 
the working conditions of employees on standard and non-standard contracts. In the remaining 
five countries (Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), relatively weak unions had an 
exclusive approach, aiming to use their limited resources to protect their own members, most of 
which have standard employment contracts. Thus, equality rationale associated with an inclusive 
approach was prevalent in countries with tradition of long established relations between the 
sectoral social partners. 
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Nevertheless, in most countries, trade unions used a combination of hard and soft instruments to 
address precarious work in the construction sector. First, the involvement of trade unions in legal 
changes seeking to improve working conditions appears to be the most effective instrument to 
address precarious work. For instance, in Poland, the lobbying actions of both unions and 
employers led to legal amendments to the procurement law in 2014, by introducing non-price 
criteria for public tenders, including the possibility to add social clauses concerning employment 
standards. In most countries, the procurement laws favour the lowest bid and/or the criteria are 
unclear (e.g. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) leading to a race to the bottom 
in terms of labour standards (commonly via a long chain of subcontracting) as well as 
accusations of corruption. Hence, a legal requirement to introduce social clauses in the bids for 
public tenders could be considered a best practice example for other countries to create a fair 
procurement process and reduce the pressure to lower labour costs.  
There were other legal initiatives adopted to address work precariousness in construction. In 
Slovenia the social partners initiated a legal change, which makes it possible to extend a multi-
employer bargaining to the entire sector if the members of the employers’ association employs at 
least 50% of the labour force in the sector. Nevertheless, the representative employers’ 
association in the construction sector does not fulfil this criteria; consequently, the collective 
agreement has not been extended. In Croatia, the political lobbying by unions led to a legal 
amendment in 2011, making the failure to pay wages a criminal offence, in context were workers 
at the bottom of the subcontracting chains were often unpaid or suffered long delays in payments. 
In Slovakia, both social partners are lobbying the government for stricter control of safety 
regulations as well as the improvement of working conditions for self-employed, following 
several fatal accidents due to poor quality of construction works. 
Although the above procedural statutory amendments seek to reduce precarious work, in practice, 
there have been rather minor improvements (if any) in working conditions following the adoption 
of those amendments.  The construction sector is the most prone to informal work in all 
countries, often linked to the procurement process, which favours a long chain of subcontracting 
to reduce labour costs. It was reported that the presence of trade unions is generally associated 
with better implementation of the labour law, but in several countries union density is under five 
percent (e.g. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). Thus, legal changes are necessary but not 
sufficient to address precarious work in the construction sector.  
Second, trade unions have been involved in collective bargaining in the construction sector in all 
10 countries investigated after 2008, but there is variation in its effectiveness in addressing 
precarious work across countries. At one extreme, collective bargaining was used to legitimize 
wage cuts in Greece, including the payment below the minimum wage for young workers. At the 
other extreme are developments in Slovenia, where unions managed to improve working 
conditions via collective bargaining after 2008. Nevertheless, similar to Greece and Romania, the 
multi-employer collective agreement in Slovenia covers only members of the employers’ 
association that signed the agreement (they employ circa 25% of the total labour force), while 
before the crisis it covered all employees in the sector. Also, employers can opt out of employers’ 
associations, if they do not want to implement the provisions of a multi-employer collective 
agreement. Furthermore, it was reported in Slovenia that the more beneficial a collective 
agreement is for standard workers, the more likely is that employers use non-standard 
(subcontracted) workers on precarious terms to reduce the overall labour costs to remain 
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competitive. In many countries, collective bargaining has become a softer instrument that set 
recommendations and guidelines for companies (e.g. in Lithuania, Poland, and Romania), 
sometimes to avoid employers opting out of employers’ associations (e.g. Romania). 
Nevertheless, the role of social dialogue and collective bargaining remained relatively stable in 
Czechia and Slovakia, but unions have agreed to more flexible working time arrangements after 
2008 (e.g. annualised working hours). In the context of a massive decline of construction works 
during the crisis and reduction of collective rights, the influence of collective bargaining on 
addressing precarious work has generally declined in after 2008.  
Finally, additional soft and hard instruments were used by unions across countries in the 
construction sector. The main soft instruments were (a) information campaigns in Czechia, 
Greece, Hungary Slovenia; (b) consultation in the form of individual services for precarious 
workers (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania and Romania); and (c) collaboration with other unions to 
eliminate bogus self-employment in Greece. Apart from legal changes and collective bargaining, 
additional hard instruments were used in the form of industrial action in Croatia and litigation in 
Greece and Slovenia. Finally, bi-partite fora have been utilised by trade unions and employers to 
fight against informal work, to deal with health and safety issues and to provide training in 
Croatia and Romania. In addition, the Romanian social partners have developed a bi-partite 
institution that provide a so-called ‘bad weather’ financial support to construction workers on 
standard contracts when there is a temporary interruption of work. This bad weather fund was set 
in 1997 and it is based on the contribution of employers, employees and customers. Creating a 
social fund based on the voluntary contribution of employers and employees (and maybe 
customers) seeking to buffer the consequences of unforeseen circumstances for employees could 
be considered a best practice example to be adopted in other countries or other sectors, as it 
supports not only employees, but it also helps companies to retain skilled employees when there 
is a lower demand for their products or services.   
Summing up, trade unions’ actions to address precarious work in the construction sector were 
primarily based on efficiency and equality rationales. Apart from the fact that it was the worst hit 
by the recession, the temporary nature of construction work and procurement laws make it rather 
precarious. Unions attempted to reduce precarious work, primarily via legislation to protect the 
most vulnerable groups (e.g. self-employed) and through collective bargaining to maintain or 
improve working conditions for standard and sometimes non-standard workers. By and large, 
collective agreements protected the working conditions for a minority of skilled employees 
working in large and medium size unionised companies, sometimes at the expense of the most 
precarious workers at the bottom of the subcontracting chains. Although unions have been 
sometimes successful in amending the legislation for non-standard workers, there are issues with 
the implementation of laws across the 10 countries, which are exacerbated by the procurement 
laws encouraging a race to the bottom concerning employment standards. Hence, amending the 
procurement laws to include social clauses could play a fundamental role in reducing work 
precariousness. Nevertheless, legal changes are not sufficient to address precarious work without 
the commitment and support of both social partners to implement the existing laws and collective 
bargaining regulations throughout the entire sub-contracting chains. 
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3.3.2 Healthcare sector 
There are both similarities and differences concerning trade unions’ actions in the healthcare 
sector across the 10 countries investigated. Low public expenditure, chronic labour shortages and 
a strong state intervention in setting working conditions are common challenges across countries, 
which led to a number of similarities in unions’ actions to address precarious work in the 
healthcare sector. First, unions’ approaches were generally inclusive, aiming at improving the 
quality of employment conditions for workers on both standard and non-standard contracts, based 
on the equality rationale. Second, despite a relatively high level of unionization, unions have 
(often reluctantly) accepted efficiency considerations for wage cuts in the public sector in most 
countries. The decline in the income of employees on standard contracts forced nurses and 
doctors to get multiple jobs, which resulted in the emergence of hybrid forms of employment 
consisting of standard and non-standard contracts in several countries (e.g. Czechia, Latvia, 
Poland and Romania – see further details in chapter 2). In these circumstances, the main focus of 
unions’ actions was to increase wages and reduce excessive workloads for medical professionals 
on standard contracts, while also attempting to prevent undermining working conditions for non-
standard workers. 
Findings suggest that unions used a combination of hard and soft instruments to fight against 
precarious work in the healthcare sector, primarily directed towards governments. Unlike in the 
private sectors investigated, governments set wages and other working conditions via legislation 
in public healthcare in most countries, except Croatia and Latvia. In the last two countries, unions 
negotiated sectoral collective agreements with the government for all employees. Despite 
involvement in collective bargaining in several other countries (e.g. Czechia, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia), unions’ actions were primarily focused on influencing the legislation affecting 
working conditions in the healthcare sector across all countries investigated.  
Unions utilized a mixture of media campaigns, political lobbying and different forms of protests 
to put pressure on governments to address precarious work, but the success of their actions varied 
greatly across countries. In countries that had loans from the Troika, unions did not manage to 
prevent pay cuts or bans on recruitment, despite using media pressure and industrial action to 
fight against the austerity measures (e.g. Greece and Romania). Although not all protests have 
been successful in the other countries, some unions managed to improve working conditions for 
healthcare staff, following various forms of industrial action or a credible threat to strike (e.g. 
Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). In Poland, a month long protest 
outside of the Prime Minister‘s office resulted in 30% wage increases for medical staff in 2008. 
However, a similar protest organised by the same union against the use of civil law contracts for 
nurses and midwives in 2011, was not successful. In Slovenia, the government agreed to 
negotiate with unions the norms and standards of work only after a strike threat in 2013; unions 
revealed that their systematic use of the media to put pressure on the government to improve 
working conditions in the healthcare sector has contributed to averting the use of industrial 
action. These developments suggests that soft instruments (e.g. information and media debates) 
are influential in supporting the use of harder instruments, such as collective bargaining and 
industrial action, showing that soft and hard instruments complement each other.  
Despite the fact that most unions had an inclusive approach to address precarious work, the 
fragmentation and divisions between different healthcare occupations was accentuated during the 
crisis in several countries (Croatia, Czechia, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia). The most common 
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divisions were between doctors and nurses. In a context of massive labour shortages, doctors 
have successfully used resignation campaigns in Czechia and Slovakia, and the threat of mass 
emigration of junior doctors in Hungary, to achieve pay raises. In contrast, nurses’ resignation 
campaign in Slovakia was not successful. The Slovakian unions adopted a combination of 
instruments, including memoranda, petitions and negotiations with the government, which 
resulted in wage increases for nurses via legislation, but there are issues with its implementation; 
in some hospitals, employers negotiated with the company-level union(s) lower wages or reduced 
unilaterally the working time and/or increased workloads to limit wage increases. In Czechia, pay 
increases for doctors are not implemented in all types of hospitals; also, wages of nurses may 
vary depending on the type of remuneration system used by the hospital. In Poland, there was a 
pay raise solely for nurses and midwives following a threat with a general strike in 2015, causing 
divisions between different occupations; nevertheless, unions are lobbying the government to 
eliminate the discrepancies between occupational groups. Despite fragmentation, sectoral unions 
manage to have a pragmatic collaboration when needed, in some countries (Slovenia, Romania, 
Lithuania and Hungary), which increased their power vis-à-vis government.  
While there are a number of similarities across countries concerning unions’ actions to reduce 
work precariousness for medical staff on standard contracts, unions’ approaches to non-standard 
forms of contracts varied greatly from elimination to expansion.  At one extreme, there have been 
attempts by unions in Croatia, Greece and Poland to eliminate subcontracting of services. In 
Greece, self-employed doctors are not accepted as members by unions, but nurses and other self-
employed staff are allowed to join union for pragmatic reasons (the organisational survival was at 
stake). In Croatia, the largest sectoral union (in collaboration with other public sector unions) has 
successfully prevented the outsourcing of non-core services in 2014. The government abandoned 
their outsourcing proposal, after unions collected the required number of citizen’s signatures 
required to call for a national referendum that would ban outsourcing in the public sector. 
Although unions have been successful in preventing outsourcing of existing services, the retired 
staff are generally replaced with outsourced workers. In Poland, unions indicated that they wish 
to eliminate bogus self-employment for medical staff, while in practice they tolerate its 
expansion, by accepting members with hybrid (standard and non-standard) contracts. Thus, 
findings suggest that the elimination strategy has rather limited effectiveness in reducing the 
share of non-standard forms, in practice. 
At the other extreme, the largest Romanian union in the healthcare sector initiated a law in 2015 
to facilitate the expansion of hybrid contracts consisting of a standard contract in the public sector 
supplemented by a self-employed contract in the private sector. The union had a pragmatic 
approach to regain the membership lost, following the 2011 arrest of their leader, Marius Petcu in 
2011. He was accused of corruption, but other union officials argued that he was targeted due to 
its efforts to mobilize workers to request a higher public expenditure for the healthcare sector 
(Trif, 2013). In a context of low wages, unions strived to support their members to get additional 
income through legal changes and by providing complementary training for nurses to enable 
them to get a second job as careers or nannies (with financial support from EU grants). The 
individual services combined with union’s involvement in collective bargaining and social 
dialogue have contributed to regaining membership to the pre-2011 level, according to a union 
official. Similar to developments in Greece, the organizational rationale was very important for 
the largest union in the sector to improve its internal legitimacy. 
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Summing up, trade unions’ actions to address precarious work in the healthcare sector were 
primarily directed towards governments aiming at increasing wages and reducing workloads for 
employees on standard contracts. Unlike the other sectors, there was no decrease in demand for 
healthcare services during the recession; however, there was a decline in public spending after 
2008, which led to wages cuts and excessive workloads in most countries, which in turn, 
accentuated the shortage of medical staff. In this context, the main purpose of unions’ actions was 
to reduce work precariousness for medical professionals on standard contracts. Healthcare unions 
were more likely to use different forms of protests than those operation in other sectors; their 
actions frequently improved working conditions for a specific occupation (e.g. doctors), which in 
turn, led to divisions and protests by the other occupations. Nevertheless, unions’ actions were 
generally inclusive (seeking to protect workers on standard and non-standard contracts) based on 
a combination of equality and efficiency rationales. Unlike in other sectors, some medical 
professionals have hybrid forms of standard and non-standard contracts. The share of non-
standards contracts (e.g. subcontracting and self-employed) is increasing in several countries; in 
Croatia, the government attempted to reduce labour costs by outsourcing non-core services in 
2014, but unions’ public initiative managed to prevent it. Similar to other sectors, healthcare 
unions’ actions were more likely to be successful in addressing precarious work, when a 
combination of hard instruments (especially various forms of industrial action or a credible threat 
to strike) and soft instruments were adopted. Despite a relatively high union density in most 
countries (except Poland), issues with the implementation of legal provisions and join regulations 
were reported in most countries, in a context of increased ownership fragmentation and a 
declining role of trade unions in the healthcare sector. 
3.3.3 Retail sector   
Trade unions’ mission to address work precariousness in the retail sector has been very 
challenging in most countries. On the one hand, there is low union density due to two main 
reasons: (a) there is a very high fluctuation of personnel in all countries, which makes it difficult 
to retain union members in a context where members join the company-level organisations; (b) 
the large majority of retail workers are employed either by small companies or by multinational 
chains, both of which are very difficult to unionize. Somewhat surprisingly, despite an 
unfavourable context after 2008, retail unions in Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia had successful organising campaigns seeking to increase their own organisational 
capacity to enable them to address precarious work. Unlike in other sectors, the organisational 
rationale played a fundamental role as the first step in unions’ actions to make possible the 
adoption of other instruments in the retail sector (e.g. collective bargaining and individual 
support) in several countries.  
On the other hand, apart from being severely affected by the recession, the specificity of the retail 
sector makes it prone to informal work practices seeking to reduce the amount of payroll taxes 
paid. The high fragmentation (it consists of a large number of small companies or workplaces), 
the high labour turnover combined with relatively low-skilled jobs as well as the legal changes 
that increased the prerogatives of employers to use irregular working hours, make it very difficult 
for Labour Inspectors to verify the implementation of the legislation (and other regulations) in all 
countries investigated. Many retail employers, particularly in small companies, use a range of 
informal employment practices, varying from workers with no contract, envelope payments on 
top of minimum wages and bogus part-time contracts for full-time employment. In this context, 
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unions and organised employers had joint initiatives to reduce informal work practices in several 
countries, such as the media campaign entitled ‘Stop the work in informal economy’ in Croatia. In 
addition, unions provided individual services in litigation cases related to lack of law 
enforcement, in many countries (e.g. Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
While unions seek to eliminate illegal work practices, they generally accept the efficiency 
rationale for using (legal) non-standard form of employment and irregular working time in the 
retail sector, but there is variation across countries. At one extreme, there were developments in 
Slovenia, Greece and Poland, where unions aspire to eliminate at least specific forms of 
precarious work (e.g. so-called ‘junk contracts’ in Poland; and, Sunday work in Greece). In 
Slovenia, unions would like to eliminate non-standard forms of employment by making it more 
expensive for employers to use them. In practice, however, their initiatives target the reduction of 
precarious work, particularly via legislation and collective bargaining. Nevertheless, a union 
representative indicated that these hard instruments have limited effectiveness; in a context were 
many workers joined unions as anonymous members in recent years, unions cannot not mobilise 
them to support collective actions. Unlike in other sectors, Slovenian unions revealed that media 
pressure is the most efficient instrument to address precarious work in the retail sector, as large 
chains are afraid of getting negative publicity in the mass media. Thus, soft instruments could be 
more effective than hard instruments in addressing precarious work, when unions lack 
mobilisation capacity.  
At the other extreme, there were developments in Czechia and Hungary, where unions supported 
legal amendments which expanded employers’ prerogatives to use functional flexibility. In 
Hungary, unions revealed that non-standard contracts, such as part-time are a ‘lesser evil’ than 
job losses. Unlike in other sectors, the retail union federation in Czechia considers non-standard 
contracts as ‘flexible’ rather than precarious, showing a high level of acceptance of efficiency 
considerations. Also, this union had an exclusive approach, by focusing their efforts on improving 
working conditions solely for their members on full-time standard contracts. Apart from the fact 
that agency workers and those on work agreements contracts were not accepted to join the retail 
unions, the provisions of the multi-employer collective agreement regulating minimum working 
conditions in the retail sector, do not cover workers on non-standard forms of contracts in 
Czechia. This exclusive approach combined with political lobbying (in relation to minimum 
wage increases and regulation of opening hours during public holidays), have not been very 
effective in improving working conditions for retail workers in Czechia, as retail continues to be 
one of the most precarious sectors in the country.  
In the other countries, retail unions generally have an inclusive approach aiming to improve the 
quality of working conditions for all workers through a combination of soft and hard instruments, 
based on equality considerations. In a context of limited sectoral collective bargaining in most 
countries (except Croatia and Slovenia), unions are seeking to amend substantive and procedural 
aspects that affect working conditions via legislation.  As regard substantive issues, retail unions 
lobby governments to increase minimum wage, which is the basic wage for the majority of retail 
workers in all countries. Also, unions seek to amend legal provisions concerning opening hours 
during week-ends and public holidays, as these are key issues in the retail sector across all 
countries. As regards procedural issues, unions use political lobbying to make it more difficult for 
employers to use non-standards forms of contracts to reduce labour costs in several countries 
(e.g. Croatia, Greece, Poland and Slovenia). Also, unions (sometimes together with organised 
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employers) lobby governments for legal changes to improve the enforcement of the laws in 
relation to working time, health and safety issues and other illegal practices in all countries. In 
several countries, organised employers and trade unions lobby together for legal changes to allow 
a stronger role for the social partners seeking at reducing informal practices (e.g. Greece, 
Hungary and Romania). Thus, the legislation is one of the key instruments used by unions to 
address precarious work in the retail sector in all countries.  
In most countries, unions also utilize soft instruments, such as media campaigns and information 
of workers to get support for legal changes. In some countries, there has been collaboration with 
other unions’ federations and confederations for some initiatives, such as ‘Stop junk contracts’ 
campaign in Poland and ‘Never work on Sunday’ campaign in Greece. Although these initiatives 
have been instrumental in raising public awareness of the poor working conditions in the retail 
sector, they have rarely been effective in reducing precarious work. A partial success was 
achieved in Poland; the media campaign against work on Sunday and on Christmas Eve, led to 
the reduction of working hours on 24th of December 2014, in the majority of large retail chains. 
Moreover, media campaigns aimed at putting pressure on specific retail chains to improve 
working conditions were considered the most efficient instrument in addressing precarious work 
in Slovenia, as discussed earlier. Media campaigns maybe more effective in the retail sector, as 
companies might be more concerned that negative publicity could discourage customers to shop 
in their outlets.  
Nevertheless, in several countries, unions were the most effective in addressing precarious work 
through organising workers combined with company level collective bargaining. In Poland, a 
union managed to organise over 1000 employees in Kaufland in 2014. Following this organising 
campaign, the union negotiated pay increases up to €50 per month and a conversion of temporary 
employment contracts (except the civil law contracts) into standard open-ended contracts. In a 
similar vein, the collective agreements negotiated after a successful organising campaign in 
several foreign retail chains in Romania, improved working time provisions (e.g. workers have at 
least one week-end free per month) and introduced bonuses for Christmas and Easter as well as 
higher rate of pay for overtime. The international union support from Ver.di and UniGlobal 
contributed to a successful organising campaign in several MNCs after 2008 in Romania. These 
developments demonstrate that it is possible for unions to organise workers in MNCs in 
unfavourable circumstances, particularly with international support.   
Overall, trade union actions’ actions to address precarious work in the retail sector were often 
different from other sectors. First, as union density in the retail sector is very low, the 
organisational considerations for unions’ actions were very important in several countries (e.g. 
Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia). Unlike in other sectors, there has been an 
increase in union density in foreign retail chains in Hungary, Poland and Romania after 2008. 
Following those organising campaigns, company level collective bargaining was successfully 
used to improve working conditions, including in transforming non-standard contracts into 
standard contracts in Poland.  
Second, the relatively weak organizational capacity of retail unions affected the instruments used 
by unions to address precarious work. Retail unions are less likely to use protests and industrial 
action than in other sectors (e.g. healthcare), respectively more likely to use soft instruments to 
address precarious work in most countries. Nevertheless, soft instruments, such as media 
52 
 
campaigns, were utilised to support hard instruments (e.g. legal changes in relation to irregular 
working hours in Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). Moreover, political lobbying seeking 
to increase minimum wage and reduce opening hours during week-ends were considered more 
effective than collective bargaining in addressing precarious work in most countries, in a context 
where the majority of workers are paid minimum wage and work irregular hours. Finally, similar 
to the construction sector, there have been joint actions between organised employers and unions 
seeking to reduce informal employment practices in the retail sector, but they were not very 
effective in a context of very limited collective bargaining coverage and limited capacity to 
enforce laws.  
Third, international collaboration with other unions played a more important role in addressing 
precarious work in the retail sector compared to other sectors. In some countries, unions 
emphasized the importance of international collaboration to improve working conditions in 
foreign retail chains, either by regular meetings to exchange information (e.g. Czechia) or by  
supporting their organising campaigns (e.g. Romania). Additionally, the campaign ‘Never work 
on Sundays’ in Greece got international support. International collaboration could be more widely 
utilized by unions to fight against precarious work in MNCs retail chains, considering there is 
virtually no competition between subsidiaries of a multinational retail chain operating in various 
countries, as they serve domestic markets.  
Summing up, the actions of trade unions in the retail sector have been primarily targeted at 
reducing informal work, increasing wages and dealing with irregular work. Different from other 
sectors, (a) the organizational rationale played an important role in several countries; (b) the 
acceptance of the efficiency rationale varied greatly across countries; and (c) media campaigns 
were more likely to be used than protests to achieve the equality rationale. Despite commendable 
efforts to organise workers and some successful initiatives in reducing work precariousness in 
specific retail chains through organising campaigns combined with collective bargaining, the 
relatively weak organisational capacity of retail unions made their actions rather ineffective in 
reducing the overall work precariousness. As a result, the retail workers continue to have some of 
the poorest working conditions across all five job quality dimensions in most countries. 
3.3.4 Metal sector   
The metal sector is a relevant part of the economy in most studied countries. From the 
perspective of precariousness and labour market dualization, it is closely intertwined with the 
TAW sector: in the majority of studied countries agency work has been the most important form 
of precarious work that the metal sector has been facing in the post-crisis years. However, while 
the TAW sector lacks unique trade union representation in the studied countries, trade unions in 
the metal sector are well established. In some countries, e.g., Croatia, Hungary and Romania, the 
metal sector trade union landscape consists of a fragmented union structure. In other countries, 
including Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, there is a centralized and coordinated union 
structure in the sector. Latvia and Lithuania are the only two countries where the metal sector 
experiences poor trade union presence. In Latvia, the sectoral trade union seized to exist.  
The presence of trade unions, often at the sector level, is not automatically translated into a 
widespread existence of sectoral bargaining. Unions participate in multi-employer and sector-
wide bargaining in Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In Poland, unions focus on the 
establishment of inter-company unions that are equipped with higher bargaining power than 
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company-level unions. In Croatia, unions are mostly active in company-level bargaining, but they 
also push for a sectoral agreement and its extension. In Hungary and Slovenia, unions use the 
sector-level union structures to lobby for legislative changes addressing fixed-term employment 
contracts.  
The rationale behind union action in the metal sector is in all studied countries strongly 
underpinned by equality considerations. In addition, in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia, the fact 
that unions recognized new opportunities to represent precarious workers also serves the purpose 
of union survival in conditions of generally declining membership and bargaining 
decentralization. Romanian unions are also motivated by improving trade union legitimacy, 
which supports the union survival rationale.  
Not in all countries did unions adopt an inclusive approach towards precarious workers. Our 
findings show that the unions’ approach differs according to the type of precarious work. Unions 
in general adopted an inclusive approach to workers in fixed-term contracts or on flexikonto 
schemes (annualised hours), but remained exclusive to agency workers (e.g., in Hungary, Greece 
and Slovakia). This is because agency workers were perceived as a threat, or competition, to 
regular employees that constitute the core of union constituency in the metal sector. The 
exclusive approach vis-à-vis agency workers has however shifted towards a more inclusive one in 
Slovakia and Romania after unions recognized the opportunity to represent a new cluster of 
precarious workers and thereby also protect the core labour force by striving for equal working 
conditions and reduction of labour market dualization. Finally, our findings document also an 
approach of separation, where unions address specific issues such as shorter working hours for 
workers in particular types of employment, or targeted services for agency workers at the 
workplace level. This is the case in Czechia, in Hungary, as well as in Slovenia. 
The metal sector trade unions engaged in a wide variety of instruments to reduce precarious work 
across each studied country. While legislative pressures remained important (especially in 
Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia), unions often engage in collective bargaining 
as the most important instrument in the metal sector. Bargaining is used at different levels from 
company level, through inter-company level to the sector level. In Lithuania, where bargaining 
coordination is marginal and a sectoral union in the metal sector does not exist, unions prioritize 
the maintenance of company-level bargaining with an inclusive approach towards precarious 
workers. Thereby they remain active in addressing precarious work and at the same time respond 
to diverse employer interests. Unions benefit from a greater degree of bargaining coordination to 
address issues related to precarious workers’ equal pay, working time regulations and a shift to 
regular employment, for example in Croatia, Poland (inter-company trade union actions) and 
Romania. 
In Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, unions also engaged in political lobbying in order 
to influence legislation concerning precarious workers. In Hungary, the metal sector unions use 
the MSZOSZ confederation to channel their lobbying activities. The 2012 draft of the Labour 
Code was successfully modified due to union intervention especially related to fixed term 
contracts, and less successfully related to temporary agency work. The Romanian trade union at 
Dacia Renault initiated a legal change requiring employers to provide the same terms and 
conditions for agency workers as for workers employed by the beneficiary company. In Slovakia, 
trade unions won legislatively stipulated co-determination rights over flexikonto implementation 
54 
 
at company level. Unions continue to fight for a legal reduction of the length of flexikonto 
schemes, while employers favour further extension of the length of flexikonto and its application 
also to agency workers. In Slovenia, the most visible effect of trade unions’ legislative action was 
the 2013 legislative amendment. It was a “political bargain” in which convergence in working 
conditions has been achieved between regular and precarious workers (e.g. concerning 
employment and dismissal procedures).  
An interesting target of unions’ legislative and lobbying efforts is the domain of education. We 
found unions focusing on reducing precariousness through education in Croatia, Latvia and 
Slovenia. In Croatia, unions push for a more flexible education system in order to equip workers 
with skills that would secure them a stable standard employment relationship. Educative 
programs in Latvia aim at overcoming the lack of interest to become union member among the 
workforce. In Slovenia, the SKEI trade union has made a systematic effort to educate permanent 
employees that agency workers are not their enemies but rather people forced to accept 
unfavourable working conditions because of existential problems.  
While legislative efforts, lobbying and bargaining at various levels are the most important union 
instruments found in the metal sector, unions in some countries also engaged in organizing and 
mobilization. Mobilization turned out ineffective in Greece, but Czechia unions succeeded with 
organizing new members by stipulating union membership outside the workplace level. This way 
membership is also open to agency workers that lack long-term commitment to a particular single 
workplace and/or employer. The best practice of organizing in response to outsourcing has been 
documented in Romania. With international support, outsourcing plans of employers yielded the 
establishment of SITT - the first trade union in the IT sector in Romania in 2009. SITT used 
rather traditional instruments of organizing, collective bargaining and strikes to defend the 
working conditions for all employees. The union managed to organize and mobilize workers to 
be outsourced and signed a collective agreement in three multinational corporations. It has 
managed to improve working conditions for outsourced workers. This case indicates that it is 
possible to organize and mobilize any type of workers to improve their working conditions, 
particularly when there is a perception of unfairness. It also shows the importance of international 
collaboration for unions to respond to global strategies of multinational corporations to reduce 
labour costs. 
In sum, trade unions in the metal sector are well established in all studied countries except 
Lithuania and Latvia. Driven predominantly by the equality rationale, unions have used their 
position to reduce precarious forms of work mainly through traditional instruments. These 
include political lobbying, legislative efforts, and collective bargaining at various levels. Despite 
the reasonably strong positions of the metal unions, sectoral bargaining is weakening in favour of 
company-level bargaining. Unions recognize this challenge and focus their resources on 
company-level bargaining and in some cases also organizing precarious workers. The general 
union approach vis-à-vis precarious workers has been inclusive, but in three countries (Greece, 
Romania and Slovakia) unions were initially not interested in an inclusive approach because 
precarious workers were often outside of unions. A shift to more inclusive approach came hand 
in hand with the unions recognizing new opportunities if representing also precarious workers 
(especially agency workers). Besides traditional instruments, unions engaged in organizing, 
educating and empowerment efforts in relation to precarious work in Czechia, Croatia, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia. 
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3.3.5 Temporary agency work sector   
The TAW sector stands out in comparison to the other sectors because of several unique 
characteristics. First, in most studied countries, TAW has been growing in the post-crisis years; 
but employment levels in the sector still resemble only a marginal share of the economy. At the 
same time, the TAW sector has been presented as highly precarious and one of the key sectors 
where labour market dualization has been developing. Second, because of the heterogeneous and 
temporary nature of agency work, trade unions often face challenges in organizing and 
representing agency workers, or perceive them even as a threat to the stable representation of 
core union members - employees with standard employment contracts.  
The fact that the TAW sector became a more significant part of the labour market only in the past 
decade is mirrored in the lack of trade union presence therein. Trade unions exclusively 
representing agency workers exist only in the Greek banking sector; and even here TAW unions 
strived for recognition by other unions, the state and employers. In Slovenia, there is a high share 
of agency workers among the Slovenian Free Trade Union. In other CEE countries, the TAW 
sector lacks union representation; however, in Czechia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
other sectoral unions took initiative to represent agency workers or engage in legislative efforts 
that affect agency work. Most often these are unions of the metalworking sector, where agency 
work is concentrated. In addition, Romania saw trade union attempts to organize and represent 
agency workers in the telecommunications sector.  
In all studied countries where unions do recognize the challenge of agency work and related 
labour market dualization, striving for equality has been the dominant rationale for union action. 
Latvia is the only country where our research did not find evidence for any union initiatives and 
therefore cannot argue that union action was driven by equality considerations.   
The approach that trade unions adopted vis-à-vis agency workers across countries ranges from 
exclusion to inclusion. In Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland unions exclude agency workers from 
their agenda and focus on protecting their core constituency in standard employment forms. A 
similar approach characterizes the main Greek trade union in the banking sector. In contrast, 
unions adopted a generally inclusive approach to integrate agency workers into their agenda in 
Hungary, Slovenia and Romania. Despite their generally inclusive approach, Hungarian unions 
rarely point attention to the needs of agency workers, and the initiatives of Slovenian unions on 
agency work are sporadic and lack long-term strategy. A more inclusive approach towards 
agency workers has been noted also in individual cases at the company-level in Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania. Examples of this approach in Poland include organizing efforts of company-level 
unions within NSZZ Solidarność to increase the share of agency workers in inter-company union 
committees in steelworks as well as in the automotive sector across General Motors and 
Volkswagen plants in Poland. Also, two small radical trade unions (the All-Poland Workers’ 
Trade Union Confederation of Labour and the All-Poland Trade Union Workers' Initiative) 
included in their internal statutes a tool of milieu (based) union organizations that enable 
inclusion of employees with different types of contracts including agency workers. Finally, in 
Croatia and Greece, we found individual examples where unions developed targeted actions 
exclusively related to TAW and thereby separated their approach to TAW from their generally 
inclusive policies targeting all workers.   
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Czechia and Slovakia are the most interesting cases from the perspective of union approach vis-à-
vis TAW. While unions initially excluded TAW from their agenda and even perceived agency 
workers as a threat to union legitimacy anchored in a constituency of workers with regular 
contracts, this approach has changed to an inclusive one after unions recognized opportunities 
that the growing share of TAW offers for union’s visibility, power and survival. In turn, the 
Czech and Slovak metalworkers’ unions became more active in promoting the specific needs of 
agency workers (e.g., job stability, equal pay, avoiding payment abuse - travel reimbursements 
instead of regular salaries, etc.).   
Because of lacking formal interest representation, in neither of the studied countries is TAW 
subject to sectoral collective bargaining or sectoral collective agreements. In such conditions of 
the missing sectoral social dialogue, trade unions have mostly concentrated their actions at two 
levels: the national level and the company level. Lobbying for legislative changes affecting TAW 
at the national level is the dominant instrument that trade unions used in 5 countries (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). While the existence of reasonable 
legislation somewhat pre-empted union initiatives to further shape legislative developments in 
Slovenia, in most CEE countries union instruments were heavily concentrated in legislative 
efforts to improve working conditions or agency workers and thereby reduce or eliminate 
precarious work. This finding aligns with broader trends in CEE countries where legislation is 
seen as the most important resource for trade union action. Union’s legislative proposals were in 
some countries (e.g., in Czechia and Slovakia) developed jointly with employers’ representatives. 
Such proposals include, among others, suggestions to legally stipulate quota for agency workers 
vis-à-vis regular workers, end user responsibility for payment of salary and payroll taxes for 
agency workers, and equal pay for equal work regardless of the type of contract.  
Efforts of collective bargaining on behalf of agency workers at company level were found only in 
Croatia (waste disposal), Hungary (electronics) and Romania (automotive, IT and 
telecommunication sectors). Slovakia stands out as the only country where unions and employers 
discuss options to launch sectoral bargaining exclusively for TAW. While sectoral bargaining 
structures were not yet established, unions signed a memorandum of cooperation with one of the 
three employers’ organizations representing agencies and sought international resources to 
benchmark and support sectoral bargaining in the TAW sector. For example, Slovak unions 
studied sectoral collective agreements applicable to the TAW sectors in the Netherlands. 
Establishing sectoral bargaining institutions is novel in conditions of persistent bargaining 
decentralization across the EU and generally hostile conditions towards coordinated bargaining 
across CEE countries.  
Besides legislative efforts and some limited attempts of collective bargaining in the TAW sector, 
we note successful efforts at organizing agency workers in Greece and unsystematic organizing 
efforts in Croatia and Slovenia. In Greece, successful mobilization concerned the conversion of 
fixed-term contracts to open-ended contracts in a service provision company, Mellon 
Technologies, which provided services to the National Bank of Greece. In Croatia, the Waste 
Disposal Trade Union in the Zagreb Holding Ltd. succeeded in organizing agency workers and 
persuaded the company management to transfer nearly 200 agency workers into standard 
employment arguing that the work implemented by them is regular and not temporary. These 
organizing efforts contrast with unsuccessful attempts of organizing and/or uniting agency 
workers in Lithuania and Romania.  
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Other instruments that trade unions have used in the TAW sector include services oriented 
towards agency workers at the company level (Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece and Romania). 
Greek unions are more advanced than CEE unions in considering vital identity politics, 
mobilizing and raising awareness on the working conditions of agency workers, and also seeking 
international trade union collaboration as well as alliances with local community movements with 
the aim to eliminate precarious work in the TAW sector. Evidence of broader alliances with other 
unions and local community movements in Greece include organization of food banks for 
precarious workers, provision of picketing support in industrial action and the use of other union 
sites for meetings with their constituents. 
In addition to the above comparative findings, the country reports document several individual 
cases where unions successfully engaged in addressing TAW. Such best practices were found in 
Czechia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia. The Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Union 
Federations launched a campaign for decent working conditions in agency work in 2015. The aim 
was to consult legislative changes on agency work with all relevant stakeholders before 
proposing them to the government. In Poland, unions gained legislatively stipulated 
codetermination rights in cases when an employer intends to retain a temporary agency worker 
for a period longer than six months. In Romania, unions were successful in reverting to equal pay 
for equal work between leased and regular employees in 2015. Finally, in Slovenia unions 
launched a data collection campaign on the spread of agency work in 2013 prior to legislative 
changes. After realizing the growing trend of TAW, unions – following Austrian benchmarks – 
proposed to introduce quota of 10% of the share of agency workers in a particular employer. 
Eventually, the quota was set at 25% after tripartite negotiations.  
Summing up, trade union initiatives in the TAW sector predominantly sought reduction or 
elimination of precarious work. The equality rationale served as the main driving factor behind 
such union action. A common characteristic across all countries is the lack of interest 
representation of agency workers at sectoral level and lacking sectoral bargaining structures. In 
the CEE countries, unions besides individual company-level cases almost exclusively target their 
actions at the national level through shaping legislation on working conditions with implications 
for the TAW sector. Additional union instruments include mobilization, organizing efforts and 
individual provision of services for agency workers. The latter union instruments were all found 
in Greece but remained marginal in CEE countries. The most important shift in union initiatives 
in the TAW sector has been found in Slovakia and partly in Czechia, where unions initially 
excluding agency workers from their agenda shifted to a more inclusive approach and signed 
memoranda of cooperation with relevant employers’ association with the vision to establish 
sectoral bargaining structures exclusive to the TAW sector. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks  
The empirical findings from the national reports suggest that unions had a pragmatic attitude in 
addressing precarious work in the 10 countries investigated. In terms of considerations driving 
the approach of unions vis-à-vis labour market flexibility, the findings shows that unions 
emphasized equality rationales for their actions. In practice, however, unions accepted economic 
considerations for using different forms of (legal) non-standard forms of employment in all 10 
countries investigated. Although there were attempts to eliminate specific forms of contracts of 
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service based on moral considerations (e.g. subcontracting in healthcare in Croatia, Greece and 
Poland as well as ‘junk contracts’ in Poland), by and large, unions considered that non-standard 
contracts are a lesser evil than job losses or being unemployed. Moreover, the equality rationale 
was generally adopted to prevent the undermining of working conditions for standard workers 
(who are the majority of union members) by workers on non-standard forms of contracts. Apart 
from seeking to protect their members, the organizational considerations played a key role in 
organizing precarious workers and providing them individual services when the organizational 
survival was at stake (e.g. in Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Greece). In Czechia and Slovakia, 
unions in the metal sector changed their approach to agency workers from exclusion to inclusion, 
when they realized that this was an opportunity to gain visibility and increase their organizational 
capacity. Unions across all 10 countries adopted primarily a pragmatic attitude aiming at 
improving their social legitimacy and organizational capacity by combining equality and 
efficiency considerations.  
Although a variety of approaches were adopted by unions to address precarious work in the 10 
countries investigated, the findings suggest that the majority of unions’ actions seek to reduce 
work precariousness by using a combination of inclusive and exclusive approaches. Against a 
background of declining statutory support for unions’ activities in many countries and relatively 
weak internal legitimacy linked to the communist legacies, unions generally considered that it 
would be impossible to eliminate precarious work. Consequently, unions strived to reduce or 
eliminate the gap between the working conditions of standard and non-standard workers through 
both inclusive (e.g. collective agreements covering all workers in a company) and exclusive 
approaches (e.g. legal changes targeting equal pay for equal work independent of the type of 
contract). Although rare cases when unions attempt to eliminate precarious work by refusing to 
accept members from specific non-standard contracts exist (e.g. self-employed doctors in 
Greece), generally unions have a pragmatic approach accepting all workers as members; in the 
case of Greece, while unions did not accept self-employed doctors, they allowed self-employed 
nurses and other staff (who are more numerous) to join unions; also, in Poland, unions reported 
that they want to eliminate bogus self-employment in healthcare sector, but in practice, they 
accepted members with self-employed contracts. Nevertheless, in addition to elimination, 
reduction and retention approaches identified by Heery and Abbott (2000), unions’ actions in 
several countries contributed to the expansion of non-standard forms for pragmatic reasons; for 
instance, in Czechia and Hungary, retail unions supported legal amendments to expand 
employers’ prerogatives to use functional flexibility to prevent job losses; in Romania the 
healthcare union initiated a legal change in 2015 to facilitate the use of a special type self-
employment to enable medical staff to top up their income by having a second work contract, as 
they have low wages. By and large, unions did not have an explicit strategy to deal with non-
standard workers; their approaches were on an ad hoc basis fluctuating across sectors and over 
time, often for pragmatic reasons. However, several Greek unions have an established approach 
of not accepting members on work contracts without social benefits. Moreover, Slovenian unions 
aim at transforming non-standard forms of employment into standard contracts. 
In terms of instruments, the empirical findings suggest that unions utilize primarily legislation, 
company level collective bargaining and industrial action to address precarious work. First, 
unions across all countries targeted governments via political lobbying, mass media and protests 
to improve individual and/or collective rights for the most vulnerable working groups, such 
workers with contracts for service (e.g. agency workers, self-employed and other subcontracted 
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work). Second, in a context of weak law enforcement, there have been joint actions by unions 
together with representatives of employers seeking to reduce informal work, particularly in the 
retail and construction sectors. In all countries investigated, law enforcement was more feasible 
in unionized companies. Third, company level collective bargaining has been used in large 
unionized companies across all 10 countries seeking to improve working conditions often 
covering all workers. Nevertheless, unions’ effectiveness in fighting precarious work via 
collective bargaining varied, being dependent on the capacity of unions to organize and mobilize 
workers as well as other structural factors, such as the availability of workers with the required 
skills. Fourth, other forms of protests (outside collective bargaining) such as resignation 
campaigns of doctors in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as mass demonstrations have 
been effective in reducing work precarious the healthcare sector. By and large, hard actions, such 
as collective bargaining, protests and political lobbying for legal changes were successful 
especially when used together with media campaigns, indicating that hard and soft instruments 
complement each other. 
Overall, the comparative findings suggest that there are several interrelated factors affecting the 
effectiveness of trade unions’ actions in addressing precarious work. First, the legal framework, 
including employment protection legislation, influence the effectiveness of trade unions’ actions 
against precarious work. More specifically, the stronger the legal employment protection the 
more likely is for unions to be able to fight against precarious work, as seen particularly in the 
case of Slovenia. Nevertheless, a specific development in all CEE and Greece is the weak 
capacity of law enforcement, which is a key inhibitor to reduce precarious work. Moreover, the 
deterioration of the protection of company level union activists (by making it easier to dismiss 
them) and/or allowing alternative employee representatives to negotiate company level collective 
agreements have reduced unions’ capacity to address precarious work through company level 
collective bargaining (e.g. Greece and Romania).  
Second, the national and sectoral industrial relations context affects unions’ effectiveness to 
address precarious work. By and large, findings reveal that unions are more likely to be effective 
in fighting precarious work in countries (and sectors) with consolidated industrial relations 
institutions, such as Slovenia and to some extent the Visegrad countries, broadly supporting the 
varieties of capitalism literature (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). Unsurprisingly, the undermining 
of multi-employer collective bargaining by statutory provisions, particularly in countries which 
required financial assistance from the Troika, has inhibited considerably unions’ capacity to fight 
against precarious work (e.g. Romania, Greece and Hungary).  
Nevertheless, the perception of extremely unfair (legal or illegal) employment practices aiming at 
reducing labour costs, led to the establishment of new industrial relations institutions in several 
countries. For instance, despite dire circumstances for unions in Romania (Trif, 2016), the 
outsourcing of IT workers led to the establishment of trade unions and new bargaining 
institutions. Also, in the case of Slovakia (and to some degree Czechia), the highly deregulated 
labour market for agency workers and the wide abuse of this work form facilitated a response by 
social partners that lays the foundations of institutional change - namely, establishment of 
bargaining foundations in a previously unorganized sector not covered by collective bargaining. 
Not solely trade unions were a central part of this process, but also organized employers were 
involved in joint actions to combat unfair competition in most countries. These findings may be 
interpreted in the Polanyian sense of 'movement' and 'countermovement' - when there is a too 
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extensive movement into one direction (high precariousness combined with lack of regulation), it 
triggers a countermovement - birth of institutions to regulate working conditions (Polany, 2001). 
Thus, the findings suggest that when employers push the economic rationale to extremes, it can 
lead to major changes in industrial relations to offset their initiatives, based on moral 
considerations. 
Third, the availability and skills of the labour force affected the ability of unions to fight 
precarious work. In a context of decentralization of collective bargaining and low union 
membership in most countries, trade unions are more likely to support precarious workers in 
large companies, as workers in SMEs are rarely unionized. Also, the findings suggest that trade 
unions’ actions are more likely to improve the working conditions of highly skilled employees in 
sectors with labour shortages (e.g. doctors in the healthcare sectors in several countries), low 
labour turnover and a dominance of employees on standard contracts (e.g. the metal sector). 
Interestingly, in extreme cases of labour market dualization, such as in Poland, unions were 
successful in generating media campaigns to counteract it; in recent years, policy makers 
recognize the Civil Law Contracts as ‘junk contracts’ in Poland (Mrozowicki et al., 2013), 
substantiating also the Polanyian 'movement' and 'countermovement' argument.  
Last but not least, the organizational capacity of unions is frequently the most important factor 
affecting unions’ ability to address precarious work in various sectors and companies. The 
findings suggest that an essential condition that enable unions to fight against precarious work is 
their capacity to mobilize workers; despite a tradition of rather cooperative relations between 
social partners in Slovenia, trade unions (which are arguable the strongest in terms of statutory 
rights and have one of the highest union density in CEE) had to use mobilization or a credible 
threat of industrial action to improve working conditions for precarious workers after 2008. 
Interestingly, the findings also reveal that charismatic union leaders play a key role in enabling 
unions to organize and mobilize workers to improve working conditions for the most vulnerable 
groups (e.g. developments in the retail and IT sector in Romania). In contrast, the allegations of 
corruption and intimidation of union leaders reduce internal legitimacy and the organizational 
capacity to reduce precarious work. Finally, joint actions with other national and international 
unions (e.g. Czechia, Greece, Poland and Romania) as well as joint actions with employers 
enable unions to fight against precarious work. Overall, findings suggest that trade unions which 
managed to gain internal legitimacy after 2008, were the most likely to be effective in their 
actions against precarious work. In a context of declining statutory support for unions’ activities 
in many countries and relatively weak internal legitimacy linked to the communist legacies, 
unions have to increase their internal legitimacy to enable them to fight against precarious 
working conditions for workers on standard and non-standard contracts. We argue that building 
organisational capacity based on pragmatic considerations is a supplementary rationale for 
unions’ actions, in addition to efficiency, equality, and social legitimacy rationales identified by 
Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
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Chapter 4: Employers and precarious work  
 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 1, the academic debate concerning precarious work has been 
predominantly one-sided: while significant emphasis has been placed on the approach and 
strategies of trade unions, not much attention has been paid on other institutional actors, e.g. 
employers’ associations and individual employers. With respect to the lack of emphasis on 
employers’ associations, this arguably reflects the historical focus of the industrial relations 
community on the role of trade unions and the respective lack of emphasis on employer 
coordination (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011). In a similar vein, and as Rubery (2015) has recently 
argued, the policy debate around precarious work has largely concentrated on the role of social 
policy and has neglected the macro-economic linkages between employment and social 
protection, limiting thus the scope for developing attempts to change employers’ behaviour.  
However, employers are responsible as the core agents for deciding on the terms of employment 
engagement and it is employers’ selection, investment and retention decisions that create 
segmented or divided labour markets (Osterman 1984, 1994; Rubery 1978, 2007). This is even 
more so in times of crisis, where it has been shown that the initiative in industrial relations shifts 
even further to employers (Strauss 1984). There are two reasons for this: the first is economic: in 
times of crisis, unemployment may provide an incentive to employers to drive down terms and 
conditions of employment. The second is policy-related, as in such cases changes may be 
implemented to support business growth and provide greater scope for management 
unilateralism, limiting at the same time the scope for deliberation and joint decision-making with 
trade unions.  
Driven by these considerations, our project focused not only on the approach of trade unions 
towards precarious work but also on that of employers and their associations. The dual focus of 
the project derives from the assumption that unions and employers may have different interests 
and engage in different activities vis-à-vis precarious work. Similar to the analysis of trade 
unions’ approaches and actions towards precarious work (see chapter 2), the analysis is focused 
here on the intended strategies and actions of employers and their associations and we consider 
the unintended consequences of their actions only where obvious and relevant for evaluating their 
overall strategy and actions undertaken in the area of precarious work.  
Focusing on employers necessitates also considering the approach of their associations, as agents 
of individual employers. It is first important to emphasise that employers’ associations in the 
countries upon which we focused were characterised in the pre-crisis period by significant 
fragmentation and institutional fragility. Most of the employers’ associations in CEE countries 
(with some exceptions, e.g. Slovenia) were relatively new institutional actors that received weak 
institutional encouragement for the development of coordination. These associations had to be 
established again – partly with the support of the state-run chambers of commerce – after the 
political revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe (Funk and Lesch, 2004). Employer 
fragmentation and the relatively recent development of a capitalist class in these countries meant 
also the absence of joint efforts towards consolidating their interests; for the same reasons, 
governments and individual employers often viewed these associations as ones that only have a 
purely consultative character. Where attempts for coordination were made, these were primarily 
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the result of FDI and foreign firms buying up domestic firms. Aside from the particular 
characteristics of these economic systems that affected employer capacity for collective 
organisation and action, employers’ associations in these countries, as in Western Europe, have 
been affected by developments in the recent decades. Structural changes to the economy have 
made organising more difficult, e.g. growth of employment in small firms in the service sector 
and decline of manufacturing (Traxler, 2008). Against this context, periods of crisis may 
accelerate these trends and present further implications for the internal organisation of 
employers’ associations themselves.  
 
4.2 Employers’ rationales vis-à-vis precarious work 
In order to assess the role of employers and their associations in dealing with precarious work, 
we proposed in our analytical framework four sets of rationales that may be taken into account by 
employers and their associations when dealing with the issue of precarious work. These include 
economic, institutional, social and organisational considerations (for an analysis, see part 1). 
Importantly, these are not independent rationales and employers may adopt a specific approach to 
non-standard work for any one, or a combination, of these considerations. 
Our empirical findings from the 10 EU Member Studies surveyed in the project suggest that 
economic considerations, consisting primarily of lowering labour costs as a means to increase the 
competitive advantage over competitors and survive during the height of the crisis, were evident 
in all countries (Table 12). This was the case not only in sectors characterised by low skills (e.g. 
retail) but also in sectors traditionally characterised by high skills (e.g. metal and healthcare). As 
expected, economic considerations, e.g. towards reducing labour costs, were guiding employers’ 
organisations actions towards increasing labour market flexibility. In this context, the extent of 
the impact of the economic crisis played a significant role: in cases where the crisis had 
significant impact (e.g. Greece and Croatia), employers considered vital the need to limit lower 
labour costs to survive the downturn. Such considerations were mostly prevalent in construction, 
metal, healthcare and retail, all sectors heavily affected by the recession and the slowdown in the 
economy. In this respect, reductions in the state budget affecting the financing of the healthcare 
system were common considerations in the majority of the countries.  
At the other end, there was some evidence that economic considerations played also a role in the 
formulation of employer approaches designed to limit to some extent the extent of 
precariousness. The most obvious one was to limit unfair competition, which was a consideration 
that was evident in the majority of the sectors with the exception of healthcare. These were 
sectors that were experiencing such challenges before the crisis but there was some evidence of 
further aggravation in respect of unfair competition practices during the crisis. Against this 
context, employers expressed a, strong sometimes, interest in regulating and limiting the use of 
such unfair competition practices. But reference to unfair competition was rather narrowly 
construed on the basis of the use of under-declared and undeclared labour and did not include 
considerations in respect of the use of other non-standard forms of employment, such as 
temporary agency work and fixed-term contracts.  
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Table 12: Employers’ economic considerations  
Sectors  Enablers  Inhibitors  
Construction Lower labour costs (Latvia, Hungary, 
Slovakia)  
Extent of the economic crisis (Greece, 
Poland) 
Limit unfair competition (Croatia, Greece, 
Slovakia, Poland) 
Healthcare  Lower labour costs (most countries), 
extent of crisis (Czechia, Latvia), 
reduction of state budget (most 
countries)  
No consideration re unfair 
competition/informal economy  
Metal  Lower labour costs (most countries), 
extent of crisis (Slovenia)  
Limit unfair competition (Croatia, Greece), 
reduce hiring costs (Hungary)  
Retail  Extent of crisis (Croatia), revenue 
stability (Slovakia)  
Limit unfair competition (Hungary, 
Slovenia) 
TAW  Lower labour costs (Czechia, Lithuania), 
cost efficiency (Greece), increase of 
market share (Slovenia, Greece) 
Limit unfair competition (Poland, Czechia, 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary) 
 
Aside from economic considerations, a range of institutional considerations, incorporating 
regulative, normative and cultural cognitive issues, seemed also to be at play as well (Table 13). 
In this context, significant enablers of labour market flexibility were considered to be the changes 
in the legislative framework during the crisis. These changes were exemplified in two areas: the 
first was in respect of employment protection legislation and included mainly liberalising further 
the use of non-standard forms of work but also reducing employment protection in the case of 
individuals on standard forms of employment (a common development across the majority of the 
countries surveyed for the project). The second was in terms of the changes in the capacity of 
collective agreements, especially higher-ones, to regulate terms and conditions of employment, 
and favouring company-level decentralisation (e.g. in Greece and Romania). In light of the 
general absence of employee representation channels at company level in most of the countries 
surveyed in the project, changes in the regulatory capacity of collective bargaining could allow in 
effect greater scope for individual negotiations between employers and employees, increasing the 
risk of unilaterally imposed terms and conditions of employment. Another enabler included the 
fragmentation of employers’ interests in the industrial relations systems (e.g. in metal in Greece 
and Hungary), with the latter hindering significantly the capacity of employers as a collective 
organisation to support (higher-level) collective agreements as a means to develop joint solutions 
against the risk of precariousness. At the same time, pressure for flexibility came in many cases 
as a result of increased activity by foreign employers, transferring their own employment 
practices from their home countries to the host ones (e.g. Lithuania).  
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On the constraining side, regulatory changes in public procurement were seen in some instances 
as providing scope for limiting the extent of labour market flexibility (e.g. Croatia, Greece and 
Poland). Similar considerations were sometimes evident in respect of the operation of extension 
mechanisms as a means of protecting their own members from unfair competition (e.g. Croatia). 
Preference for ‘controlled labour market flexibility’ was also expressed by employer 
representatives in specific sectors (e.g. metal in Slovakia and retail in Greece).  
Table 13: Employers’ institutional considerations  
Sectors  Enablers  Inhibitors  
Construction Changes in the legislative framework 
(Greece, Romania), pressure for flexibility 
from foreign investors (Lithuania) 
Public procurement  legislation (Croatia, 
Greece, Poland)   
Healthcare  Extent of structural labour market reforms 
(Greece) 
State interference in hospital administration 
(Slovenia)  
Metal  Fragmentation of employer interests 
(Greece, Hungary)  
Protection of members from unfair 
competition (Croatia), regulation of 
flexibility (Slovakia)   
Retail  Constraining bargaining framework 
(Greece, Romania), business taxation 
(Hungary) 
Support for extension of collective 
agreements (Croatia), controlled labour 
market flexibility (Greece)  
TAW  Lower employment protection legislation 
(Czechia) 
Role of employers in the IR system 
(Greece)  
 
There was somewhat less evidence of social considerations by employers playing a role in 
enabling labour market flexibility and increasing the scope for precariousness (Table 14). 
However, there were some exceptions. The first concerned the need of employers to contain 
disruption in sectors where the effect of such disruption would be greatest, e.g. healthcare and 
metal in Poland, involving, among others, having recourse to non-standard forms of work (e.g. 
outsourcing). Considerations of a more positive nature were expressed in terms of using non-
standard forms of employment as a means to promote employment in the economy more 
generally (e.g. metal in Greece). A specific case was made in the case of temporary agency work: 
e.g. that the latter would promote employment in its capacity as acting as a stepping stone for full 
and open-ended employment. On the other hand, a variety of social considerations seemed to be 
at play in respect of inhibiting greater flexibility in the labour market. Among others, there was 
rhetoric of decent working conditions in some sectors including construction, healthcare and 
agency work (especially in the case of Lithuania). The issues of public accountability (e.g. 
healthcare sector in Greece) and avoidance of dismissals (e.g. Slovakia) were also mentioned in 
this context. The view of employees as consumers but also as a source of human capital for 
employers (e.g. retail in Greece) acted as a rationale for arguing in favour of controlled flexibility 
65 
 
in the labour market. The recent institutionalisation of the temporary agency work sector and the 
challenges therein for employers’ associations were translated into a preference for controlled 
flexibility as a means to entrench the social legitimacy of such practices as well as that of the 
employers’ associations representing employers providing such services.  
 
Table 14: Employers’ social legitimacy considerations 
Sectors  Enablers  Inhibitors  
Construction No evidence of social legitimacy 
considerations  
Health and safety (Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania), decent working conditions 
(Lithuania)  
Healthcare  Containment of disruption (Poland)  Accountability (Greece), decent working 
conditions (Lithuania) 
Metal  Containment of disruption 
(Poland); promote employment in 
the economy (Greece) 
Avoidance of dismissals (Slovakia) 
Retail  No evidence of social legitimacy 
considerations  
Employees as consumers but also source of 
human capital (Greece)  
TAW  TAW as a stepping stone (Hungary, 
Greece) 
Legitimacy of TAW practices (Greece, 
Poland), decent working conditions 
(Lithuania)  
 
Finally, organisational considerations were considered high in the agenda of employers (Table 
15). On the enabling side, these included changes in the organisational structure of the companies 
as well as in the business and production cycles (e.g. Poland, Croatia and Hungary). Changes in 
technology as well as the need for efficiency were also considered important considerations for 
promoting labour market flexibility in the case of retail (e.g. Hungary) and healthcare (e.g. 
Slovakia). On the inhibiting side, issues that were considered important by employer 
representatives were the need to attract and maintain skilled labour (e.g. Hungary and Slovakia), 
to promote vocational education and training (e.g. Poland) and respond to labour shortages (e.g. 
Croatia and Czechia). As a result, there was an orientation towards reconsidering the role of 
labour market flexibility: this was evident in a number of sectors and countries.  
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Table 15: Employers’ organisational considerations 
Sectors  Enablers  Inhibitors 
Construction Changes in organisational structure 
(Poland), business cycle (Hungary) 
Vocational education and training (Croatia, 
Poland), skills development (Lithuania, 
Slovakia) 
Healthcare  Hospital efficiency (Slovakia) Labour shortages (Croatia, Czechia) 
Metal  Production organisation (Croatia), 
organisational commitment (Poland)  
Attract skilled labour (Hungary, Slovakia), 
vocational education and training (Poland)  
Retail  Business organisation (Greece, Poland, 
Slovenia), technological changes 
(Hungary) 
Labour turnover (Slovakia), labour shortages 
(Croatia) 
TAW  Business organisation (Latvia)  Labour shortages (Czechia) 
 
4.3 Employers’ approaches vis-à-vis precarious work  
Driven by these sets of considerations, employers’ associations and employers may respond to 
the risk of precarious work in particular ways. As discussed in chapter 1, we view expansion, 
status quo, reduction and elimination as the objectives of the employers’ strategies and 
approaches (Figure 4). While in some cases employers and their associations may develop 
specific initiatives, it is important to acknowledge here that, the notion of ‘initiative’ implies an 
element of strategic freedom which employers may simply not have and employers may act 
either as individuals or collectively (Streeck, 1987: 281). 
In the construction sector, elimination was completely absent as an objective among employers’ 
associations (Table 16). Instead, the majority of approaches were clustered around the 
preservation of status quo (e.g. Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia). In 
this respect, considerable emphasis was placed on regulatory stability. A variant of this included 
an emphasis, common across a number of countries, on recalibrating the status quo in order to 
maintain flexibility and reduce/eliminate the scope for unfair competition through the use of 
informal work. Evidence of some differentiation within single countries was provided: in Croatia, 
for instance, preference for expansion of non-standard forms of work was coupled with support 
for collective bargaining. Reduction constituted an objective for a smaller number of countries 
(Croatia in respect of collective bargaining and public procurement, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovenia) and expansion as an objective was only clearly borne out in Croatia (but only to partial 
extent) and Latvia.  
There was limited evidence of clear strategies on the part of employers in respect of including, 
separating or excluding precarious workers. Examples of an inclusive approach were reported in 
the cases of Croatia and Slovakia: in Croatia, the adoption of this approach was seen as a means 
to counter the rise of informal work, while in Slovakia, employers joined forces with unions to 
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improve conditions for self-employed. In Greece, collective bargaining was used to protect young 
workers in the sector from the application of the lower national minimum wage levels. In 
countries where employers considered legislation as the best means to deal with such issues (e.g. 
in Czechia), preference was expressed for excluding precarious workers as any action on behalf 
of employers would not be sufficient. The Polish and Romanian cases provided example of 
separation, with employers offloading the responsibility of dealing with precarious work to their 
subcontractors.  
In healthcare, the split between the four objectives between countries was more evenly 
distributed (Table 16). In contrast to the rest of the sectors, there was a significant number of 
countries where elimination of precarious work was considered by the employer side. Possible 
reasons for the prevalence of elimination in healthcare included the shared social norms regarding 
the role of healthcare services in the society but also the fact that in many cases, it was the state 
that was considered responsible for the austerity-related measures. Among others, the objective 
of elimination was prevalent in Greece and Slovakia. Interestingly, in neither of these cases was 
there an actual elimination of precarious work in practice. For instance, in Slovakia individual 
hospitals were able to comply creatively with the legislation and as such continued using non-
standard work in respect of nurses and doctors. In Greece, the precariousness of the cleaning 
support staff continued despite recent changes designed to eliminate this problem. At the other 
end, expansion of labour market flexibility was sought by employers in Croatia, Hungary and 
Poland. The preservation of the status quo was considered by a larger number of countries (e.g. 
Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Hungary) and reduction was only considered in two cases 
(Czechia and Lithuania). In contrast to the construction sector, the adoption of an inclusive 
approach to precarious workers was reported by a number of employer representatives in the 
healthcare sector. Evidence of an inclusive approach was provided in Croatia, Czechia, Greece, 
Poland and Slovenia. Instead, a strategy of separation was adopted in Hungary; similar 
developments were reported in Slovakia (albeit there was some evidence there of exclusion as 
well).  
Metal was one of the sectors, where the majority of employers in the countries surveyed were in 
favour of expanding labour market flexibility (Table 16) (Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Poland and Romania). Most important issues concerned here increasing working time 
flexibility and liberalising further the use of non-standard workers (including temporary agency 
workers) in the sector. In four countries, the preservation of status quo was favoured (Croatia, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia) while in three (Hungary and Lithuania) there was some evidence 
of an objective to reduce labour market flexibility. What came across here was the differentiation 
was found between large employers, who were reportedly in favour of reducing the scope for 
labour market flexibility and SMEs (e.g. Lithuania). Evidence of an inclusive approach was 
provided in Croatia (employers were in favour of including trainee rights in collective 
bargaining) and Slovakia (employers did not treat workers in flexiconto or temporary agency 
work exclusively but expressed instead preference for the expansion of working time flexibility 
across the entire workforce). A separation approach was pursued in Czechia and Hungary, while 
exclusion of non-standard workers was reported in Greece, where collective agreements often did 
not cover non-standard workers.  
In retail, the majority of employers were in favour of greater labour market flexibility (Table 16) 
(Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland –SMEs-, Slovakia and Slovenia). Preference for 
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preservation of the status quo was reported in the following countries: Greece (large employers), 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania) and reduction was instead the objective in Czechia, Greece 
(SMEs), Poland (large employers) and Romania (in terms of informal work). Again here, 
differentiations in the approach between small and large employers were found. An example here 
was that of Greece, where big retail chains were in favour of extending/preserving the status quo 
but employers’ associations representing smaller companies were instead in favour of containing 
some elements of labour market flexibility whilst preserving the status quo. The opposite was 
true in the case of Poland, where smaller employers were in favour of more flexibility but large 
were not. Variety in the preferred approach towards precarious workers was also reported. In 
Croatia, Greece, Poland and Slovakia inclusiveness was the preferred strategy among employers. 
An interest in limiting the scope for discrimination was reported in the case of Slovakia, with 
employers avoiding a differentiation between precarious and other workers; however, 
divergences were found in respect of the narrow scope of collective agreements which excluded 
in some cases agency workers or student workers. In a rather different vein, the Romanian case 
constituted a variant, with employers expressing preference for negotiating sectoral collective 
agreements that would be erga omnes applicable, indicating thus an inclusive approach. In 
contrast, evidence of separation was provided in Czechia, where collective agreements applied 
only to permanent employees, while no clear strategy was evident in Slovenia.  
Finally, in temporary agency work, the general preference was for greater flexibility across all 
countries and/or maintenance of status quo in respect of regulation. Employers and their 
associations in Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia supported the 
expansion of agency work, while the preservation of the status quo was pursued by employers in 
Croatia, Czechia, Hungary and Lithuania. In some of the cases, a mixture of approach was 
adopted, reflecting again differences between employer associations. This included Czechia 
where APA was in favour of further deregulation in contrast to APPS, which supported stricter 
regulation in order to eliminate unfair competition practices. The only case where reduction was 
considered was in the case of Poland in respect of the use of civil law contracts. But even in this 
case, the general preference was for greater flexibility in the use of agency work. In terms of the 
employers’ approach to precarious workers, an inclusive approach was adopted in Czechia and 
Romania, albeit in the latter it was largely the result of statutory intervention. But in Greece, 
employers and their associations refused to recognise the newly established trade unions, 
implying an exclusive approach and a separation approach was observed in Poland.  
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Table 16: Employers’ approaches vis-à-vis precarious work  
Sector  Expansion   Status quo  Reduction  Elimination  
Construction  HR (substantive rights), LV CZ, GR, HU, 
LT, RO, SK  
HR (support for 
CB and 
procurement) LT, 
PL, SL 
No evidence  
Healthcare HR, HU, PL HU, LV, RO, 
HU 
CZ, LT GR, SK,  
LT, SL  
Metal  HR, CZ, GR, RO, SLO, LT 
(SMEs), SK, PL 
HR, PO, RO, 
SL 
HU, LT (large 
employers) 
No evidence  
Retail  HR, CZ, HU, LT, PO 
(smaller employers)  
HR, GR (large 
employers) 
HU, LT, RO  
CZ, GR (SMEs), 
PO (large 
employers), RO 
(informal work)  
No evidence  
TAW  HR, CZ, GR, LT, PO (TAW 
expansion), RO, SL 
HR, CZ, HU, 
LT 
PL (civil law 
contracts)  
No evidence  
 
4.4 Employers’ instruments vis-à-vis precarious work  
Having identified employer considerations, their approaches and objectives in respect of 
precarious work, the third step in developing our analytical framework is distinguishing between 
the forms of action that employers have at their disposal in order to reach their goals set out in the 
adopted approaches vis-à-vis precarious work. Building on the work by Keune (2011), we 
distinguish a number of instruments that may be used by employers’ associations when engaging 
with their members, governments and trade union: information, consultation, negotiation and 
organising (for details, see chapter 1). In this context, the relationship between employers’ 
associations with other actors, e.g. the state and trade unions, is particularly important and our 
project paid particular attention to the dynamics in these areas and how these relationships have 
evolved since the emergence of the crisis.  
When considering the relationship between employers and unions, a primary mechanism for 
dealing with precarious work is collective bargaining. Particular importance can be provided here 
to the role especially of higher-level bargaining, as it has the capacity to lead to the coordination 
of employer approaches at company level and achieve hence greater effectiveness when dealing 
with labour market flexibility and its implications for precarious work. In this respect, the 
findings suggest that there were three categories of systems/countries depending on the extent of 
which collective bargaining has been used to deal with aspects of labour market 
flexibility/precariousness. The first concerns systems/sectors where the role of collective 
bargaining remained unchanged. This category includes two further sub-categories. The first 
includes countries/sectors where collective bargaining (at higher-level) was under-developed and 
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no change took place during the crisis (including using bargaining as a means to deal with 
precarious work). In terms of countries, this was the case predominantly in Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and to some extent Czechia. In terms of sectors, the temporary agency work sector was 
the clearest example: the absence of higher-level bargaining could be attributed to the recent 
institutionalisation of the sector and the fragmentation of employer and union interests alike. The 
second sub-category (of no change during the crisis) refers to countries/systems where collective 
bargaining was still used during the crisis as a means to respond to the changing context and the 
rise of precarious work. In terms of countries, there were very few examples where such 
developments were observed (Croatia being somewhat close to this). In terms of sectors, 
preservation of collective bargaining was found mostly in the metal sector. The second type 
concerns countries/sectors, where the role of bargaining declined. The majority of countries were 
located in this category (Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland - steelwork). 
Two reasons explain this: the first was direct policy interventions designed to reduce the role of 
collective bargaining. This was the case in Greece, Romania and Hungary. The second reason 
was rather persistent bargaining blockages by the parties (e.g. in Slovakia and Poland).  
Besides higher-level bargaining, where still used, other forms of interaction between employers 
and trade unions were developed to deal with the changes in employment practices since the 
emergence of the crisis. Broadly speaking, these could be divided into four types of actions. The 
first concerned traditional company-level bargaining: this was the case in countries where 
collective bargaining at company level was relevant even before the crisis (e.g. Poland and 
Lithuania). However, some evidence was provided of increasing reliance on company-level 
bargaining in other countries as well (e.g. Greece), which used to rely on high-level bargaining in 
the pre-crisis period. The second form of interaction concerned soft initiatives jointly undertaken 
by both employers’ associations and trade unions. Evidence of such attempts was mostly 
provided in the case of the construction sector, where health and safety issues or the codification 
of skills proved to be issues upon which the industrial relations actors were able to develop some 
joint action (e.g. Poland). The third concerned joint action (with unions) targeted at the policy 
decision-makers. Attempts to influence reforms in public procurement legislation towards 
incorporating social clauses, found in the cases of Croatia and Poland, could be included here. 
Finally, there was even some evidence of organising social/civil action on the part of employers, 
with example of the retail sector in Greece (e.g. opposition against the Sunday trading rules) 
being one of the most notable ones.  
However, our empirical findings suggest that the most important interlocutor for employers was 
not trade unions but the state. In all countries, there was evidence to suggest that employers 
directed the majority of their efforts towards influencing public policy making in the area of 
labour market regulation. What explains this preference towards attempts for input into policy 
decision-making and lobbying for regulatory changes? There are possibly three main reasons for 
this. The first is that interaction with the state was seen by a number of employers and their 
associations as a means to compensate for the decline/collapse of collective bargaining. This was, 
for instance, the case in Greece and Romania, where in the absence of regulatory support for 
higher-level bargaining, employers’ associations intensified their efforts towards using political 
instruments, e.g. political lobbying and social dialogue to influence policy decision-making 
processes. The second reason was that in many of the countries surveyed in the project (e.g. 
Croatia, Hungary and Poland) statutory law constituted traditionally the main source for 
determining the terms and conditions of employment. The primacy of statute in setting out labour 
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standards meant that employers were more inclined to focus their attention in influencing the 
nature and direction of legal reforms. Finally, evidence suggests that employers and their 
associations saw providing input to policy decision-making as a complement and not a substitute 
to other instruments, including collective bargaining and unilateral initiatives (e.g. Croatia).  
Besides attempts to develop joint action with unions and influence policy decision-making, our 
empirical findings suggest that two other types of activities were undertaken increasingly by 
employers and their associations. The first activity concerned the growth of voluntary, unilateral 
initiatives at sectoral level (by employers’ associations) designed to build and disseminate 
benchmarks on employment standards among their members. The clearest case here was of 
ethical codes of conduct that were developed in the temporary agency work sector (e.g. Czechia, 
Greece and Poland). This can be attributed to the recent institutionalisation of the sector as well 
as the need of employers’ associations to secure social legitimacy not only within individual 
employers but also within the wider society. The second activity concerned similar activities, e.g. 
guided by ideas developed in business ethics and corporate responsibility, at company level. Such 
company-level initiatives, which were designed to promote, was mostly evident in industrial 
relations systems that lacked sectoral bargaining (e.g. Poland).  
 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
In light of the empirical findings from the national reports, we can make a number of 
observations regarding the role of employers when dealing precarious work. First, in terms of 
considerations driving the approach of employers vis-à-vis labour market flexibility, our findings 
were not surprising in respect of the emphasis that employers placed on economic considerations 
and in particularly the reduction of labour costs. At the same time, there was evidence to suggest 
that other considerations inhibiting recourse to labour market flexibility were considered across 
different countries and certain sectors. Such considerations included issues related to social 
legitimacy in the case of healthcare, for instance, institutional changes (e.g. policy reforms 
affecting employment protection legislation and collective bargaining affecting the majority of 
the countries since the start of the crisis) and organisational issues (e.g. changes in technology 
and production organisation).  
Moving on to consider the variety of approaches adopted by employers, our findings suggest that 
the majority of employers were in favour of maintaining or expanding (in certain countries and 
sectors) labour market flexibility. However, this was qualified to some extent. So, even in cases 
where employers were in favour of expanding labour market flexibility, there was support for the 
development of ‘controlled flexibility’, e.g. a clear regulatory framework that would reduce the 
scope for unfair practices. But it is important to add here that in the majority of these cases, unfair 
practices were conceptually associated by employers’ representatives with informal work; in very 
few cases (e.g. the retail sector in Greece) did these incorporate other forms of precarious work 
(e.g. very low paid work and non-standard contracts). Further, the study confirmed the existence 
of divisions between different employers’ associations. The clearest case of this was found in the 
temporary agency work sector: in a number of countries, different employers’ associations fought 
for regulatory space to influence policy-makers, public opinion but also to mobilise and organise 
existing and potential members. Besides these issues, there was evidence to suggest that the 
employers’ approaches (in terms of including, separating or excluding precarious workers) were 
not always formulated and as such did not constitute specific strategies.  
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Finally, in terms of instruments, our empirical findings suggest that in respect of labour market 
flexibility the state was the preferred party for interaction for employers. In this respect, most of 
their attempts concentrated on shaping benchmarks on employment standards, participation in 
consultation exercises and developing political lobbying activities for/against the expansion of 
precarious work. In few cases, reliance on the state was complemented by other activities, which 
fell into two main categories. The first was joint actions with trade unions: however, an important 
caveat in such cases was the withdrawal of regulatory support for collective bargaining, reducing 
hence the incentives for social dialogue and joint action in respect of the risks associated with the 
rise of precarious work. The second concerned the development of unilateral, voluntary driven 
initiatives at both sectoral and company-levels. These initiatives, which were clearly inspired by a 
discourse of corporate responsibility and business ethics, indicated a shirt towards unitarist HRM 
policies. In some cases, there is still some support for collective bargaining (e.g. Croatia and 
Greece).  
To conclude, our findings suggest that in line with previous research, the initiative shifted indeed 
to employers during the crisis. In this respect, our research illustrated how despite the limited 
(until hitherto) conceptualisation of employers in the academic and policy debates around 
precarious work employers’ choices are playing an important role in the growing trends towards 
precariousness. In conjunction with the operation of structural (e.g. unemployment and extent of 
economic crisis) and policy (e.g. labour law deregulation) reasons, they redefine working and 
living conditions. In line with the idea of reconsidering the role of employers as core agents of 
labour market segmentation (in the words of Rubery, 2015), different mechanisms can be 
developed to counter these trends and address effectively the implications from the rise of 
precarious work. It is these issues that the next chapter turns to examine.  
 
Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The world of work has changed: transformations in the organisation of work, austerity policies 
affecting labour law, the retrenchment of welfare policies and deepening inequalities are 
challenging the nature and role of industrial relations actors in national systems of industrial 
relations. A central feature of the world of work today is the transfer of risks from employers to 
the workforce. A process of so-called “de-mutualisation” has been set in motion consisting of the 
shifting of risks and the bearings of costs of risks away from a set of entities (in the case of the 
labour market, the state, the employers and the workers) back to the individual workers 
(Countouris and Freedland, 2013). In the context of precarious work, this has taken place in a 
variety of ways (Davies, 2013). The most obvious is the shift from employment to self-
employment. The de-mutualisation aspect is found here mostly in the case of bogus self-
employment and self-employed individuals that are though economically dependent. These trends 
have become particularly pronounced in the recent years with the growth of the ‘platform’ or 
‘gig’ economy. Another example here includes the shifting of the risk of a drop in demand onto 
the workforce. Variable working hours have been used extensively in a number of EU Member 
States, especially since the emergence of the economic crisis. Rather than being guaranteed a 
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particular level of hours and income each week, many workers have a zero-hours contract or may 
be casuals or may have simply flexible working hours. The shifting of the risks back to individual 
workers is further illustrated when considering the implications of fragmentation of organisations 
for workers, e.g. in the case of complex supply chains.  
Against this context, PRECARIR aimed to investigate and critically assess the role of industrial 
relations actors in addressing precarious work in Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia since 2008. The project focused on the 
initiatives and responses that trade unions and employers' associations developed: to address the 
rise of the dual labour market, and especially the growth of precarious work in five sectors, 
namely public healthcare, the metal industry, construction, retail and TAW; to protect, represent 
and improve through collective bargaining and social dialogue the social rights of vulnerable 
employee groups in precarious employment; to adjust industrial relations structures and 
bargaining procedures to better reflect the character of the post-crisis dual labour market.  
In focusing on these issues, PRECARIR was innovative in three main ways. The first was its 
exclusive focus on EU Member States in the periphery of Europe. With certain exceptions (e.g. 
Koch and Fritz, 2013), academic work on precarious work has tended to focus on the 
precarization trends in the ‘old’ EU Member States. PRECARIR instead focused exclusively on 
Central and Eastern Europe and Greece, the latter representing an example of an industrial 
relations system undergoing radical changes as a result of the recent economic crisis. The second 
distinctive aspect of PRECARIR concerned the actor-oriented approach of the project. This 
meant focusing on the role of social partners in addressing precarious work in these countries. 
Importantly, the research examined not only the role of trade unions but also that of employers’ 
associations, an actor often neglected in industrial relations studies including those dealing with 
precarious work. The issue of effectiveness of the actors’ approaches vis-à-vis precarious work 
was here crucial. In this context, our project did not assume a priori that the industrial relations 
actors would necessarily adjust their approaches and instruments when dealing with the changes 
in the world of work. Instead, it was recognised that this may not be the case and a number of 
considerations would be relevant here, including the inability of the actors to adjust their 
approaches or the belief in the effectiveness of their instruments dealing with these changes at 
present.  
The third innovative aspect of the project concerned the definition of precariousness. Despite the 
increasing number of studies dealing with precarious work, the term remains problematic and 
contested. The vagueness in its definitional reach and the real extent of ‘precarization’ have been 
intensely debated both within the academic community and the policy-level at national and EU 
levels. In this context, there is a risk that the terms “non-standard employment” and “precarious 
work” may be conflated and many academic studies have sought to associate precarious work 
with particular types of employment contracts, including part-time, fixed-term and agency work. 
However, as McKay suggests (2013: 199), ‘this promotes a false separation between different 
forms of contract, attributing precarious work to some forms only and primarily’, leading to the 
exclusion of standard, full-time and permanent employment from being considered as exhibiting 
elements of precariousness. Informed by an approach that considers that it is necessary to develop 
a holistic notion of precariousness, PRECARIR sought to assess the causes and consequences of 
precarious work by focusing on the intersection of economic, social and institutional factors. In 
this respect, a multi-dimensional approach to precariousness was adopted focusing on the 
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following aspects: income security, job security, social security, working time and collective 
voice.  
 
5.2 The incidence and nature of precarious work in CEE countries and Greece  
The first task of the comparative project was to assess the changes in the nature and extent of 
precarious work in the ten EU Member States. Importantly, the mapping and review of the main 
legal and labour market characteristics related to precarious work (provided in chapter 2) 
provided evidence of significant increase in precarious work across the countries and sectors 
examined for the project. In a context of weak law enforcement, deepening of the economic crisis 
in a number of countries, policy reforms associated with labour market deregulation and decrease 
in unions' role and influence, our findings confirmed a general trend towards an increase of 
precarious work. Importantly, while the growth of precarious work has been traditionally 
associated with the growth of non-standard forms of employment, our findings strongly 
suggested that precariousness was in many cases the outcome of the erosion of the standard 
employment relationship. Confirming previous work that suggested that in times of crisis the 
initiative shifts to employers (Strauss, 1984), there was evidence to suggest that in respect of the 
changes here, e.g. affecting those on standard employment contracts, it was predominantly the 
conduct of employers that contributed most to the precarization trends. The developments related 
partly to inadequate earnings, limited social protection and restrictions in terms of the effective 
exercise of the right to organise and bargain collectively. This was the case in all countries and 
sectors examined in the project except the case of TAW.  
There was still evidence to suggest that those workers on non-standard for employment, 
including here dependent self-employment and informal workers, till, were more exposed to 
precarious working conditions across the 10 countries. The exposure of such groups was greater 
in the construction and the retail sectors, often doing work for small domestic firms. In contrast, 
large (often multinational) firms, particularly in the construction and metal sectors relied more 
often on outsourcing to reduce labour costs. The share of agency workers, fixed-term and part-
time employees rose across the countries but less than expected in some countries (e.g. Croatia 
and Romania) due to labour shortages associated with massive emigration and the fact that 
employers had sufficient leverage to force changes, including on working time, to workers on 
full-time open-ended contracts. Thus, the labour market deregulation meant the shifting of the 
initiative in industrial relations from unions and employers' associations to individual employers 
by widening their prerogatives to set employment conditions, which in turn, increased legal and 
illegal forms of precarious work in all countries investigated. 
While precarious work became more prevalent across the EU Member States examined in the 
project, our evidence suggests that there were still significant differences in terms of the 
prevalence of precarious work among employers between different countries but also between 
different sectors within a single country. Across the 10 countries, there was cross-country 
variation in the level of labour dualization: 
 There was a reduction of labour market dualization in Hungary, Greece, Romania and 
Slovenia after 2008 due to the erosion of working conditions for employees on standard 
contracts, by weakening of employment protection legislation; 
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 There were very limited changes in the level of labour market dualisation in Latvia and 
Lithuania after 2008, primarily due to strengthening protection for non-standard workers, 
while relaxing job security for standard employees. 
 There was an increase in labour market dualization in Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia and 
Poland, primarily due to a rise in the share of non-standard contracts. 
The project explored the reasons behind this phenomenon, including changes in the regulation of 
the labour market, especially in the context of the economic crisis, but also more structural issues 
including increasing competition between companies, shifting organisational practices at 
company level and changes in the labour market (e.g. increase of migrant workers). The varieties 
of labour market dualization were primarily contingent on the different policy-level responses to 
the economic crisis and the process of EU integration, with these driving a process of labour 
market deregulation in a number of countries. These developments were refracted at domestic 
level and interacted with the degree of institutional embeddedness of the industrial relations 
actors themselves, their approaches towards precarious work and the role that social dialogue and 
collective bargaining played, if at all, in this context, to produce different to some extent effects 
in the countries and sectors studied in the project.  
Interestingly, there was evidence to suggest that the trends towards precarious work were 
common across CEE countries and Greece. It may be inferred that the economic crisis and the 
resulting crisis-related policy measures in the labour market, affecting individual employment 
rights and wage determination via collective bargaining initiated a process of convergence 
between CEE countries and Greece, with Greece converging to the policies and practices in the 
labour market of CEE countries. This confirms the argument of Schulten and Müller (2014) that 
the extent to which the relevant regulatory framework in Greece departed from the pre-crisis 
legal/institutional model of collective bargaining as a result of the crisis-related measures was 
particularly pronounced and had the potential to lead the Greek system of collective bargaining 
onto a different institutional trajectory, one that is possibly closer to the model of absent or 
single-employer bargaining of the UK and the majority of Central and Eastern European 
countries.  
Another explanation, which is not necessarily alternative but may be complementary to the role 
of the crisis in bringing up convergence between CEE countries and Greece, points to the de jure 
but primarily de facto similarities in the industrial relations systems of CEE countries and Greece 
in the pre-crisis period. Similar to the CEE countries, the regulation of the labour market was 
premised on joint regulation between the social partners but with a strong interventionist role of 
the state, via primarily statutory regulation but not only. The state-centred orientation of the 
Greek system of industrial relations meant that the impact of the ‘structural labour market 
reforms’ would have and it had indeed a more pronounced effect on the nature and extent of 
precarious work. Furthermore, Greece has been traditionally characterized by high shares of self-
employment, indeed the highest in the EU. Similar to CEE countries, the rates could disguise 
employment relationships and as such a significant percentage of these individuals could be 
bogus self-employed.  
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5.3 The role of the industrial relations actors in dealing with precarious work  
The rise of precarious work has implications for all industrial relations actors, including 
predominantly trade unions but equally importantly employers and their associations. As 
explained earlier, our project did not assume a priori that the industrial relations actors would 
necessarily adjust their approaches and instruments when dealing with the changes in the world 
of work. Against a context of increasing labour market deregulation and structural changes 
affecting negatively union density rates, trade unions are faced with challenges in terms of the 
objectives underlying their approach to precarious work and the instruments used to deal with the 
changes in the world of work. In both CEE countries and Greece, the role of unions in the pre-
crisis period shared some common characteristics, involving, among others, a reliance on external 
legitimacy provided most often by the state with this impacting upon  their internal legitimacy, 
including the necessity to organise and mobilize workers to prove their raison d'être (Crowley, 
2004). These distinctive characteristics of the systems became crucial when the economic crisis 
hit Europe in 2008-2009. Crisis-related policy reforms targeted specifically the systems of wage 
determination and collective bargaining in a number of EU Member States examined in the 
project (e.g. Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). Institutional considerations 
influenced substantially union approaches vis-à-vis precarious work across all EU Member 
States, with social legitimacy objectives having an implicit influence on unions’ strategies and 
activities.  
Driven generally by a combination of equality and efficiency rationales, trade union approaches 
and instruments to deal with precarious work varied across sectors, with these being contingent 
on sector-specific internal (e.g. organisational capacity) and external (e.g. employers, state 
regulation and state of the market) factors. There was variety in terms of their strategies across 
countries from aiming to convert non-standard work arrangements to standard employment in 
Slovenia to supporting the economic rationale of precarious work forms in Latvia. In doing this, 
unions adopted generally an inclusive approach to non-standard workers, but in some cases 
developed separate activities targeting specifically these categories of workers.  
When it came to the instruments used by unions to deal with the rise of precarious work, those 
were consistent with pre-existing practices at national and company levels. Sector-level 
instruments were poorly developed except for Greece and somewhat Slovenia and Slovakia, this 
being consistent with the broader literature around the types of industrial relations systems across 
these countries (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). While in the pre-crisis period, union legitimacy 
was often intertwined with state support (Trif, 2013), our findings across the different countries 
and sectors suggest that since the emergence of the crisis unions' initiatives to improve precarious 
employment conditions through legislation often failed. However, such failures had in certain 
cases unintended consequences, e.g. they sometimes resulted in innovative or 'recombined' old 
and new strategies to fight against precarious work. Some interesting cases were reported, 
including organizing in response to outsourcing (the case of Romanian trade unions in metal), 
mobilization, empowerment (e.g. Greece and Czechia) and establishing bargaining mechanisms 
from scratch in previously unorganized sectors (e.g. the case of TAW in Slovakia). Importantly, 
the main implication of these union approaches and instruments was the reduction of precarious 
work, albeit it was simultaneously recognised that it would be impossible to eliminate such forms 
of work.  
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A distinctive feature of our project was the focus on employers and their associations as key 
agents responsible for policies and practices affecting the nature and extent of precarious work. 
Confirming previous studies, our research illustrated how the initiative in the labour market 
shifted to employers during the crisis. Despite hence the limited attention given to employers in 
the academic and policy debates around precarious work, their choices and how these are 
articulated and promoted by their associations are playing an important role in the growing trends 
towards precariousness. In conjunction with the operation of structural factors (e.g. 
unemployment and extent of economic crisis) and policy development (e.g. labour law 
deregulation), employers have been able essentially to redefine working and living conditions. 
Our findings suggest that a range of economic considerations was taken into account by 
employers in a number of countries and sectors, leading often to calls for labour market 
flexibility. However, this was far from universal. There was some evidence to suggest that in 
certain sectors, non-economic considerations were also important, inhibiting in certain cases the 
case for greater labour market flexibility. Such considerations included issues related to social 
legitimacy in the case of healthcare, for instance, institutional changes (e.g. policy reforms 
affecting employment protection legislation and collective bargaining affecting the majority of 
the countries since the start of the crisis) and organisational issues (e.g. changes in technology 
and production organisation).  
Even in cases where the approach of employers was clearly oriented towards favouring labour 
market flexibility, the type of labour market flexibility sought was not ‘disorganised’; instead, 
calls were made for ‘controlled flexibility’, e.g. a clear regulatory framework that would reduce 
the scope for unfair practices. But it is important to add here that with very exceptions, unfair 
practices were conceptually associated by employers’ representatives with informal work. 
Further, the study confirmed the existence of significant divisions between different employers’ 
associations. The clearest case of this was found in the temporary agency work sector: in a 
number of countries, different employers’ associations fought for regulatory space to influence 
policy-makers, public opinion but also to mobilise and organise existing and potential members. 
Besides these issues, there was evidence to suggest that the employers’ approaches (in terms of 
including, separating or excluding precarious workers) were not always formulated and as such 
did not constitute specific strategies.  
Finally, in terms of instruments, the state was the preferred addressee of the initiatives developed 
by employers’ associations. In this respect, most of their attempts concentrated on shaping 
benchmarks on employment standards, participation in consultation exercises and developing 
political lobbying activities for/against the expansion of precarious work. In few cases, reliance 
on the state was complemented by other activities, which fell into two main categories. The first 
was joint actions with trade unions: however, an important caveat in such cases was the 
withdrawal of regulatory support for collective bargaining, reducing hence the incentives for 
social dialogue and joint action in respect of allocating the risks associated with the rise of 
precarious work. The second concerned the development of unilateral, voluntary driven 
initiatives at both sectoral and company-levels. These initiatives, which were clearly inspired by a 
discourse of corporate responsibility and business ethics, indicated a shirt towards unitarist HRM 
policies.  
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5.4 A future beyond precarious work 
Confirming previous studies (McKay, 2013), our project emphasised the strong linkages between 
precarious work and the process of demutualisation of risks in the employment relationship. In 
simple terms, a consequence of the growth of precarious work has been a shift of risk from the 
employer to the worker. This is the so-called case of ‘vertical demutualisation’ (Countouris and 
Freedland, 2013), whereby employing enterprises use the precarisation of work as a way of 
transferring to their workers risks which they themselves previously carried. Taking into account 
that employers are core agents of labour market segmentation (Rubery, 2015), it may be then that 
it is employers’ conduct designed to re-allocate risks that is leading to the growth of precarious 
work. In this respect, the role of the legal/institutional framework and the approach of the main 
industrial relations actors is crucial in countering these trends and addressing effectively the 
implications from the rise of precarious work. 
In light of our actor-centred perspective, our recommendations are designed to address the main 
industrial relations actors responsible for dealing with precarious work in the labour market, e.g. 
states, employers’ associations and trade unions. Owing to the distinctive characteristics of the 
national industrial relations systems but also the labour markets more generally, it would be 
utopian to outline here specific policy recommendations that would be applicable across the 
countries included in the study. This is even more the case in respect of employment standards 
and precarious work: as Barbier (2013) has aptly illustrated, genuine and significant meanings of 
precarious work require the embedding of concepts in each political culture and in their constant 
evolution. However, what can be considered instead here is a set of general principles that can 
then be used to inform the debate around the formulation of specific recommendations at each of 
the countries. 
In this context, it is possible to distinguish a set of principles on the basis of the addressees. The 
first address is the state. In this respect, consideration should be provided on the nature of the 
interplay between statutory rights and the operation of collective bargaining. The role of the 
institutional framework is here crucial. Informed by the acknowledgement that it is the 
employers’ actions that may create and/or sustain segmented labour markets, it is first necessary 
to re-orient the institutional framework towards a re-mutualisation of the risks associated with the 
employment relationship. Integral to this would be a shift of the balance of regulation away from 
a reliance solely on individual employment rights established via statutory regulation towards 
extending collective bargaining.4 While support for collective bargaining has traditionally 
differed per country and even sector, it cannot be disputed that collective bargaining is an 
essential mechanism for inclusive labour markets.  
A recent OECD report (2014) argued that ‘reducing the legal extension of collective wage 
agreements might lower labour costs and promote employment, especially for the low-skilled, 
which is good for growth but it might also contribute to widening wage distribution’ (OECD 
2014: 115). In a similar vein, the IMF has also recently stated that ‘more lax hiring and firing 
regulations, lower minimum wages relative to the median wage, and less prevalent collective 
bargaining and trade unions are associated with higher market inequality’; increasing the income 
share of the poor and middle class actually increases growth (Ostry et al. 2016). And it is multi-
employer bargaining structures that are the most inclusive in terms of the level of coverage 
                                                          
4 For similar proposals in the UK, see Institute of Employment Rights, 2016. 
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(Visser et al, 2015).5 The role of the state would be crucial here. Central to this would be the re-
instatement and/or further promotion of multi-level collective bargaining using a variety of 
methods. Depending on the national systems of industrial relations, these would be include in 
principle establishing and supporting multi-employer, sector-wide bargaining mechanisms to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment and encouraging the development of procedures to 
resolve disputes of a collective and even individual nature.  
Support for collective bargaining would not imply the absence of support for improving statutory 
employment rights (see also Institute of Employment Rights, 2016). Such rights would continue to 
operate as minimum standards on which collective bargaining would build, across a wide range 
of areas. Drawing on the findings indicating the role of low pay in exposing workers to 
precarious conditions, it would be first necessary to consider both the scope and levels of national 
minimum wage regulation, involving in all cases the social partners. In light of the implications 
of variable hours of work for working conditions, changes would need to be considered in order 
to limit the extent of income insecurity associated with such practices (for recent examples, see 
the case of New Zealand). Thirdly, statutory intervention would be required to limit the extent of 
bogus self-employment and use of civil law contracts that are particularly prevalent in CEE 
countries but also in Greece. Central to this would be the introduction of a presumption of an 
employment relationship in all cases; the onus would be here on the employer to prove that the 
relationship is not actually one of employment. More broadly and still in relation to the issue of 
employment status, changes to the statutory framework of all EU Member States would be 
necessary to make labour standards universal, strengthen the employment relationship, define it 
more clearly and promote legal certainty. Finally, ensuring effectiveness in terms of the 
application of labour standards would also need to be promoted, involving, among others, easier 
access for the adjudication of employment disputes as well as more effective remedies.  
Aside from considering these issues that relate to the role of the state, it would be of course 
crucial for the social partners, e.g. trade unions and employers’ associations, to reflect upon their 
approaches internally, the way these parties interact with each other and the state and the impact 
these may have on the nature and extent of precarious work. Broadly speaking, this would entail 
a process of self-reflection and recognition of best practices and possibly also failed strategies, 
developing benchmarks for action on the basis of learning from other sectors and countries, 
promoting an exchange of views and dialogue with social partner representatives in other sectors 
and countries and at the European level in order to formulate joint views on how to address 
precarious work, raise awareness about precarious work and contribute effectively to the 
establishment, via collective bargaining and input to policy-making, and effective monitoring of 
labour standards.  
When considering the approach of trade unions specifically, attention would need to be paid to 
the strategies vis-à-vis representing workers in precarious work, including crucially those on non-
standard forms of employment. Further, in light of the role of multinational companies in 
exporting precarious work practices across their subsidiaries, trade unions would need to devise 
new strategies and use effectively existing ones, including here European Works Councils, to 
coordinate their approaches towards precarious work across borders. On the part of employers’ 
                                                          
5 Bargaining coverage seldom exceeds 25 per cent of workers in countries characterized by company-level 
bargaining (Visser et al. 2015). 
80 
 
associations specifically, attention would need to be paid to the role of individual employers in 
creating and/or sustaining labour market fragmentation. Evidence from the EU Member States 
suggests that a range of considerations may act to inhibit the development of ‘uncontrolled’ 
labour market flexibility, including not only social legitimacy and institutional considerations but 
also economic, in the form of limiting the scope of unfair competition. Taking into account these 
issues would involve a re-calibration of the role that employers’ associations may play in labour 
market regulation away from precarious work and towards instead the re-mutualisation of the 
risks inherent in the employment relationship. Finally, in engaging in such processes of reflection 
and in considering and undertaking such forms of action, the social partners will be able to act 
jointly with the state to develop strategies and policies that move beyond precarious work, 
reducing ultimately insecurity and inequality in the European economy and society.  
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